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INTRODUCTION
'Tar and away the best prize that life offers is the chance to
work hard at work worth doing."
-President Theodore Roosevelt (1858-1919)
The enactment of Title VII' federal anti-discrimination legislation
in 1964 was just as much a symbolic act as a legal one.2 Before its
enactment, employers were free to discriminate against individual mem-
bers of certain classes without fear of legal or social repercussions.
However, after recognizing the harms fueled by unfettered employment
discrimination, Congress radically strayed from American common law
1. Throughout this Article, "Title VII" refers to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1964).
2. See Jeffrey M. Hirsch, The Law of Termination: Doing More with Less, 68 MD. L.
REv. 89, 138-39 (2008).
3. See Civil Rights Acts-The Origins of Civil Rights Legislation, -The Reconstruction Era,
The Emergence of Jim Crow, ENCYCLOPEDIA.JRANK.ORG, http://encyclopedia.
jrank.org/articles/pages/6065/Civil-Rights-Acts.htm (last visited Nov. 28, 2010).
26 [Vol. 18:25
THE EMPLOYMENT QUALIFICATIONS APPROACH
and enacted legislation prohibiting such practices.! Undoubtedly, this
legislation was a tremendous step toward equality in 1964. Yet since
then, Title VII has seen few changes and, nearly fifty years later, em-
ployment discrimination remains pervasive.
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964' was enacted with the goal
of eradicating discrimination in employment. The legislation proscribes
discriminatory conduct such as the discharge, refusal to hire, segregation
of, classification of, or placing limitations on an employee in any way that
would deprive the employee of equal employment opportunities. Title
VII seeks to achieve its noble goals by utilizing a categorical framework to
prohibit employment discrimination on the basis of membership in cer-
7
tain class categories: race, color, religion, sex, and national origin.
The workplace and societal landscapes of 2011 are immensely dif-
ferent from those of 1964. In 1964, discrimination was widely accepted.
Today, though discrimination still occurs far too often, it is not nearly as
widespread.! The discrimination of today also takes several different
forms-the overt and invidious form that almost exclusively comprised
workplace discrimination in 1964, discrimination based on misconcep-
tion or stereotype, and discrimination caused by distractions such as
personal characteristics.' Employment discrimination today affects the
same groups as it did in 1964 in different proportions, and also affects
some groups that were not even heard of by most of the public in 1964
(e.g. transgendero persons)."
4. See id.
5. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1964).
6. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(b) (1964).
7. See Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1964)), available at
http://www.eeoc.gov/laws/statutes/titlevii.cfm. A few other types of discrimination,
such as discrimination on the basis of age and disability, are covered by separate legis-
lation and are discussed later on, infra.
8. See Hirsch, supra note 2.
9. Each of these types of discrimination will be further defined, discussed, and explained
infa.
10. Herein, unless otherwise specified, the term "transgender" is used to encompass all
members of the "trans" community, defined as: people whose gender identity (sense
of themselves as male or female) or gender expression differs from that usually associ-
ated with their birth sex. ... transgender people live part-time or full-time as
members of the other gender [and include] anyone whose identity, appearance, or
behavior falls outside of conventional gender norms... . However, not everyone
whose appearance or behavior is gender-atypical will identify as a transgender per-
son." Transsexual persons are transgender persons who undergo surgery or medical
procedures to alter their appearance to conform to their "sense of themselves as male
or female."). See Am. Psychological Ass'n, What does transgender mean?,
http://www.apa.org/topics/sexuality/transgender.aspx (last visited Apr. 24, 2011).
11. See How Do Transgender People Suffer from Discrimination?, HuMAN RIGHTS CAM-
PAIGN, http://www.hrc.org/issues/1508.htm (last visited Nov. 28, 2010).
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Title VII has failed to eradicate discrimination from the workplace,
as evidenced by the 93,277 bias discrimination complaints filed against
employers in 2009 alone. 2 Title VII has made great strides in improving
workplace opportunities and mitigating workplace discrimination since
its enactment, but change is necessary in order to foster increased suc-
cesses and to achieve its broad remedial policy goals. Title VII does not
protect all workers against wrongful employment discrimination, and it
does not adequately or consistently protect the workers that it was sup-
posed to cover, either. Title VII is an admirable and somewhat effective
step. Still, it is "but a first step." 3 Title VII worked in its current form
for many years, but in order to address the discrimination of today and
potentially eradicate the discrimination of the future, change is needed.
In fashioning a remedy to address all of the different forms and oc-
currences of workplace discrimination happening in the present day, the
"pressing need is not symbolism, but a workable regulatory scheme that
actually results in less discrimination" against a wider array of individu-
als." Employment is the cornerstone for nearly all other rights and
privileges in American society-without employment, an individual likely
cannot afford basic necessities such as shelter and nutritious food, cannot
hope to obtain a quality education, cannot afford health care, and cannot
even contemplate discretionary purchases that enrich and invigorate life.
All individuals need equal opportunities to earn a living and to provide
for themselves and their dependents. Title VII does not provide such
things to all workers as is. For many employees, Title VII is more a sym-
bolic recognition of their situation than substance or support.
Currently, Title VII arbitrarily assigns individuals into classes that
time and again are defined and interpreted narrowly to avoid granting
employment non-discrimination protections and equal employment
opportunities to qualified workers. No regulatory scheme will likely ever
eradicate all discrimination in the workplace, but there must be a differ-
ent regime that would result in less discrimination, and discrimination
against fewer individuals and groups of individuals, than Title VII as
currently constructed. The unfortunate truth is that discrimination op-
erates in such a way that a categorical approach-adding or redefining
12. Bias discrimination complaints are not the only type of complaints the EEOC re-
ceives, and this figure does not include complaints that go unreported or those that
are settled prior to EEOC involvement. Thus, the problem of discrimination in em-
ployment is far more prevalent than this figure may make it appear. See Emp'r Res.
Inst., EEOC: Near-Record Number ofBias Complaints in 2009, CAL. EMPLOYER ADVI-
SOR (Jan. 15, 2010), http://www.employeradvice.com/publicl5425print.cfm.
13. Peter Brandon Bayer, Rationality-And the Irrational Underinclusiveness of the Civil
Rights Laws, 45 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1, 3-4 (1988).
14. See Hirsch, supra note 2, at 139.
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categories as the sole means by which to provide employment non-
discrimination protections-is not now and will never be enough to
combat all of the forms of discrimination and protect the victims there-
of.
To take just one group as an example, the way in which "because of
sex" is narrowly defined disproportionately and severely affects
transgender individuals." Because transgender persons are not one of the
enumerated categories in the statute and because sex discriminations are
construed narrowly, Title VII does not cover transgender persons.
Transgender persons face discrimination in many contexts every day, as
victims of hate crimes and other forms of prejudice. 6 Although
"transgender people face disproportionate amounts of discrimination in
all areas of life, [this is] especially [so] in employment."17 Currently, in
38 out of 50 states, it is legal for an employer to take adverse employ-
ment action against an employee solely because of their gender identity
or expression," i.e. because they are transgender. Today, no nationwide
federal legislation specifically protects transgender individuals from
workplace discrimination by private employers." Thus, the vast majority
of transgender employees have no available recourse or remedy when
15. An estimated one in 10,000 persons in the United States is a male-to-female
transgender person, and one in 30,000 persons is a female-to-male transgender per-
son. See Faith Isenhath, Federal Law Regarding Transgender Employees and Gender
Identity Claims in the Workplace: An Overview, 57-JAN FED. LAW. 47, 47-48 (2010)
(citing Am. Psychological Ass'n, Answers to Your Questions About Transgender Indi-
viduals and Gender Identity 1 (2006), available at http://www.apa.org/topics/
sexuality/transgender.pdo.
16. See Brian Moulton & Liz Seaton, Transgender Americans: A Handbook for Under-
standing, HUMAN RIGHTS CAMPAIGN, at 11 (2008), available at http://www.hrc.org/
documents/Transgender-handbook.pdf.
17. Employment, NAT'L CTR. FOR TRANSGENDER EQUALITY, http://transequality.org/
Issues/employment.html (last visited Jan. 30, 2011).
18. Employment Non-Discrimination Act, HUMAN RIGHTS CAMPAIGN, http://www.
hrc.org/issues/workplace/enda.asp (last updated Feb. 26, 2010).
19. Recently, under the Obama administration, gender identity was added to the list of
classes protected by federal equal employment opportunity policies, prohibiting
discrimination on the basis of gender identity in federal employment. Administra-
tion Adds Gender Identity to Equal Employment Opportunity Policies, ACLU (Jan. 5,
2010), http://www.aclu.org/Igbt-rights/administration-adds-gender-identity-equal-
employment-opportunity-policies. Additionally, as of the time this Article was
published, twelve states (California, Colorado, Iowa, Maine, Minnesota, New Jersey,
New Mexico, Oregon, Rhode Island, Vermont, Washington) and Washington, D.C.
prohibit gender identity discrimination by private employers. James D. Esseks, Sexual
Orientation and Gender Identity/Expression, 828 PLI/LIT. 381 (June 24, 2010) (citing
Statewide Employment Laws & Policies, HUMAN RIGHTS CAMPAIGN, http://www
.hrc.org/documents/EmploymentLaws andPolicies.pdf (last updated July 26,
2010)).
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subjected to discrimination in the workplace. The employment situation
for a majority of transgender individuals can be described as follows:
[u]nemployment and under-employment are huge issues for
transgender people-and particularly for transsexual people
who often lose their jobs during or after their gender transi-
tions. Transgender people who transition after working
somewhere for an extended period of time often encounter
blatant discrimination from people who do not understand or
accept them. Later, when looking for a new job, they may run
into the same trouble with potential new employers who find
out that they've transitioned. Within the transgender commu-
nity, it is not uncommon to find people dramatically
underemployed regardless of their experience or background.20
The lack of employment non-discrimination protections creates
"multiple liabilities"2 1 for transgender individuals, and for others not
covered by Title VII's categorical protection scheme. In the end, the Ti-
tle VII categorical scheme denies transgender and other persons equal
employment opportunities and protections in a manner that is unfair,
22
unjust, and does violence to such persons.
So long as Title VII categories constrain workplace opportunities
and are read narrowly to exclude transgender individuals from "because
of sex" non-discrimination protections, those individuals will continue
to suffer the disproportionate, unfortunate, and widespread effects of
workplace discrimination.2 ' The lack of Title VII protections for
transgender employees means, in real terms, that transgender people face
relentless and pervasive discrimination and harassment. They risk their
20. See Moulton & Seaton, supra note 16.
21. For a comprehensive national survey on the state of employment for transgender
persons, and the effects that unemployment and employment discrimination have on
transgender individuals, see National Transgender Discrimination Survey, NAT'L CTR.
FOR TRANSGENDER EQUALITY (Nov. 2009), http://transequality.org/Resources/
NCTEprelim-survey-econ.pdf.
22. These harms and denial of protections to transgender persons are accomplished in
various ways, as is discussed throughout this Article. For example, some courts have
claimed that transgender individuals are merely "pretending" to be the other sex, or
that Title VII's "because of sex" provision was not intended to include transgender
individuals, or that the provision is aimed at discrimination on the basis of biological
sex, but not a change of sex.
23. Although transgender individuals face pervasive and invidious discrimination in all
facets of daily life, this Article elects to focus on the treatment of transgender persons
in employment because employment is a gateway for many other important rights,
resources, and privileges, from housing to health care.
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jobs, livelihoods, homes, and families to undergo a gender transition felt
necessary to achieve happiness and a state of body in line with their state
of mind.24 If they are fortunate enough to have a job, their job perfor-
mance will be eclipsed by a characteristic that is completely irrelevant to
their qualifications to do the job. No matter how hard they work, or
how much they succeed, or how well they lead, they will almost never
get that promotion, bonus, or recognition-all because they are
transgender. If in such a situation transgender status were replaced by a
characteristic currently protected by Title VII's categorical system, like
race or religion, this discrimination would not be tolerated. Yet, this
treatment is ratified by Title VII's exclusion of transgender persons (and
many, many others) from its protections. For those not welcomed into
the fold of Title VII protections, reality is bitter cold.
It has been the "historical tendency of anti-discrimination law to
use categories to define protected classes of people." 25 This Article chal-
lenges the categorical approach and seeks to change that limited
framework. This Article focuses on the flaws with Title VII's categorical
approach and discusses why there is a desperate need for change to
combat the different types and targets of workplace discrimination to-
day, focusing on the transgender community as one example.
After discussing the current framework and operation of Title VII,
this Article analyzes the insurmountable flaws inherent in the categorical
approach to anti-discrimination law, and specifically considers Title
VII's failures to the transgender community as exhibited by case prece-
dents. Then, this Article refutes the categorical approach and proposes a
de-categorized reformulation of Title VII, a concept that, to the Author's
24. See generally supra note 21.
25. See Meredith R. Palmer, Note, Finding Common Ground: How Inclusive Language
Can Account for the Diversity of Sexual Minority Populations in the Employment Non-
Discrimination Act, 37 HOFSTRA L. REV. 873, 891 (2009) (citing The Civil Rights
Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1964)); Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co.,
415 U.S. 36, 44 (1974) (stating that "Congress enacted Title VII ... to assure equali-
ty of employment opportunities by eliminating those practices and devices that
discriminate on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin"); Griggs v.
Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 429-30 (1971); Emily Q. Shults, Sharply Drawn
Lines: An Examination of Title IX Intersex, and Transgender, 12 CARDozo J.L. &
GENDER 337, 337 (2005); E. Christi Cunningham, The Rise ofIdentity Politics I: The
Myth of the Protected Class in Title VII Disparate Treatment Cases, 30 CONN. L. REV.
441, 446 (1998) (suggesting that Title VII was intended to remedy inequities experi-
enced by historically disadvantaged groups); Paul Steven Miller, Disability Civil
Rights and a New Paradzgm for the Twenty-First Century: The Expansion of Civil Rights
Beyond Race, Gender, and Age, 1 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 511, 512-15, 520 (1998)).
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knowledge, has never before been proposed.26 This new category-less
approach would replace relevant parts of Title VII's text with language
focusing on an individual's objective qualifications for employment.
Under this new proposal, the determination of whether that individual
is the "most qualified" for the job is the key question, and employment
decisions based on factors other than job qualifications are strictly pro-
hibited. The culmination is the "Employment Qualifications Approach"
("EQA"). Penultimately, this Article addresses the possible benefits and
drawbacks that might attend implementation of the EQA. Finally, this
Article asserts that the EQA is the best hope and means by which to af-
ford currently unprotected employees, including transgender persons,
equal employment opportunities and non-discrimination protections
through the law.
I. TITLE VII, PAST AND PRESENT
A. The History and Intent Behind Title VII and
the Categorical Approach
Congress enacted Title VII with the aim of exterminating discrimi-
natory employment practices.27 The statute imposes certain obligations
on employers, grants certain rights to employers and employees, and
also establishes an administrative entity (the Equal Employment Oppor-
tunity Commission ("EEOC")) to enforce parties' rights.28 Title VI
proscribes discriminatory conduct such as the discharge of, refusal to
hire, segregation of, classification of or placing limitations on an em-
ployee in any way that would deprive the employee of equal
26. Although one scholar has advanced a "traditional equity" conception of anti-
discrimination law and Title VII, see John Valery White, The Irrational Turn in
Employment Discrimination Law: Slouching Toward a Unified Approach to Civil
Rights Law, 53 MERCER L. REv. 709, 709 (2002), and another scholar has pro-
posed a "totality of the circumstances" framework, see Mark S. Bandsuch, Ten
Troubles with Title VII and Trait Discrimination Plus One Simple Solution (A Totality
of the Circumstances Framework), 37 CAP. U. L. REV. 965, 966 (2009), both of these
still operate within and utilize categorical constraints. According to the Author's re-
search, this is the first academic publication to suggest de-categorization within the
context of anti-discrimination law.
27. See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 430-31 (1971).
28. Although the information is important for parties to know, the administrative and
procedural processes through which parties file charges and bring claims is not the fo-
cus of this Article. For more detailed information, please see 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5
(1988).
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employment opportunities.29 To be clear, although Title VII prohibits
certain discriminatory conduct on the basis of sex or other characteris-
tics, it does not require employers to act to rectify existing imbalances in
group or class representation within the workforce (e.g. with affirmative
action programs).30 Title VII's purpose is not to standardize employment
workforces or match workforce demographics with the general popula-
31tion, but rather, its purpose is to equalize employment opportunities.
"As originally conceived, Title VII was to operate as a vehicle by which
minorities would enter the mainstream of American life assured of the
opportunity to compete for jobs on a nondiscriminatory basis"32 and "to
promote hiring based on qualifications rather than on the basis of [char-
* *033
acteristics] .
Title VII employs a categorical framework, but the genesis of and
reasoning behind the framework is unclear. This Author posits that the
Reconstruction Amendments, specifically the Fourteenth and Fifteenth
Amendments to the U.S. Constitution, may be the genesis of the cate-
gorical framework in anti-discrimination law. Section One of the
Fifteenth Amendment explicitly lists categories and prohibits voting dis-
crimination on those bases: "The right of citizens of the United States to
vote shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any State
on account of race, color, or previous condition ofservitude."0 The Four-
teenth Amendment also speaks in terms of categories, but on less
explicit terms, stating in relevant part:
Representatives shall be apportioned among the several States
according to their respective numbers . .. But when the right
to vote at any election . . . is denied to any of the male inhab-
itants of such State, being twenty-one years of age, and citizens
29. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(b) (1964).
30. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(j) (1964) ("Nothing contained in this subchapter shall ...
require any employer . . . to grant preferential treatment to any individual or
group."). However, other legal provisions do state such requirements. See, e.g., Exec.
Order No. 11246, 30 FR 12319, 12935, 3 CFR, 1964-1965 Comp., 339. (1965).
31. See Griggs, 401 U.S. at 429-30 ("The objective of Congress in the enactment of Title
VII is plain from the language of the statute. It was to achieve equality of employ-
ment opportunities and remove barriers that have operated in the past to favor an
identifiable group .. . over other employees.").
32. Harvard Law Review, Sex Discrimination, 84 HARv. L. REV. 1166, 1166 (1971).
33. See Anjali Chavan, The "Charles Morgan Letter" and Beyond: The Impact of Diversity
Initiatives on Big Law, 23 GEo. J. LEGAL ETHics 521, 531 (2010).
34. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV; U.S. CONsT. amend. XV.
35. U.S. CONsT. amend. XV § 1 (emphasis added).
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of the United States, or in any way abridged ... the basis of
representation therein shall be reduced in proportion.36
The Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments, enacted in 1868 and
1870 respectively, were the first instances of federal legislation to speak
in terms of categories of specific individuals. Other pieces of civil rights
legislation were enacted in the intervening period between the Recon-
struction Amendments and the Civil Rights Movement era, including
The Civil Rights Act of 187137 (and its well-known Section 1983")
and The Lloyd-La Follette Act of 1912 . However, these pieces of leg-
islation did not refer to categories of individuals by their
characteristics. It was not until the Civil Rights Era, and The Equal
Pay Act of 1963'0 and the Civil Rights Act of 196441 (and its Title
VII), that characteristic-based categories reemerged in legislation.42
Thus, it appears that the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments were
the origin of the categorical framework in anti-discrimination law gen-
erally and in Title VII specifically-a framework which has continued
throughout history largely unaltered and unquestioned, until now.3
36. See U.S. Const. amend. XIV § 2 (emphasis added).
37. 17 Stat. 13 (1871).
38. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1996).
39. 5 U.S.C. § 7211 (1912).
40. 29 U.S.C. § 206; see also 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1) (2007) ("No employer ... shall
discriminate ... between employees on the basis of sex by paying wages to employees
in such establishment at a rate less than the rate at which he pays wages to employees
of the opposite sex in such establishment for equal work.").
41. 78 Stat. 241 (1964).
42. Though not legislation, Executive Order 8802 of June 25, 1941 prohibited racial
discrimination in the national defense industry, stating in relevant part: "it is the pol-
icy of the United States to encourage full participation in the national defense
program by all citizens of the United States, regardless of race, creed, color, or na-
tional origin." See Exec. Order No. 8802, 6 FR 3109 (1941).
43. Over time, countless scholars and legislators have proposed amendments to Title
VII's substance, or stand-alone legislation separate from Title VII, in order to grant
additional groups employment non-discrimination protections. See, e.g., Palmer, su-
pra note 25, at 892; J. Banning Jasiunas, Note, Is ENDA the Answer? Can a "Separate
But Equal" Federal Statute Adequately Protect Gays and Lesbians from Employment Dis-
crimination?, 61 OHIO Sr. L.J. 1529, 1556-57 (2000). However, all such proposals
still utilize Title VII's categorical framework. Some academics have criticized the cat-
egorical framework for various reasons. See, e.g., Rosalio Castro & Lucia Corral,
Comment, Women of Color and Employment Discrimination: Race and Gender Com-
bined in Title VII Claims, 6 LA RAZA L.J. 159, 161 (1993) (criticizing Title VII's
categorical approach "because it fails to recognize that racism and sexism interact in-
extricably"). Nonetheless, according to the Author's research, this is the first academic
publication to suggest a reformulation of Title VII outside of categorical constraints.
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B. Title VII: The Statute
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 utilizes a categorical
framework, prohibiting employment discrimination on the basis of
membership in certain class categories: race, color, religion, sex, and
national origin.4 ' Title VII applies to all private employers, state and
local governments, and educational institutions that employ fifteen or
more individuals. Title VII states in relevant part:
(a) Employer practices.
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer-
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or
otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect
to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of em-
ployment, because of such individual's race, color, religion,
sex, or national origin; or
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants
for employment in any way which would deprive or tend to
deprive any individual of employment opportunities or oth-
erwise adversely affect his status as an employee, because of
such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.47
In order to consider the practical operation of Title VII's categori-
cal framework and its effect on uncovered individuals (i.e. transgender
persons and others), it is helpful to consider a specific class category.
Therefore, this Article will focus on Title VII's protections against dis-
crimination "because of sex." Within Title VII the phrases "because of
sex" and "on the basis of sex" are defined as follows:
Definitions
For the purposes of this subchapter- .
44. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1964).
45. See Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1964)), available at
http://www.eeoc.gov/laws/statutes/titlevii.cfm.
46. Federal Laws ProhibitingJob Discrimination Questions and Answers, U.S. Equal Emp't
Opportunity Comm'n (Nov. 21, 2009), http://www.eeoc.gov/facts/qanda.htm.
47. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 [Section 703] (1964).
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(k) The terms "because of sex" or "on the basis of sex" in-
clude,
but are not limited to, because of or on the basis of pregnancy,
childbirth, or related medical conditions; and women
affected by
pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions shall be
treated
the same for all employment-related purposes.
The prohibitions against discrimination "because of sex" in Title
VII were a final-hour addition to the statute, and as such, there "is a
dearth of legislative history"" on the meaning, scope or intended effect
of the provision. Initially, Title VII was primarily aimed at excising race-
based discrimination, before other protected classes (including sex) were
added..o Title VII's "because of sex" provision was offered as a floor
amendment in the House of Representatives, "without any prior legisla-
tive hearings or debate." Allegedly, the measure was proposed by an
actual opponent of Title VII, a Southern congressman whose strategy
was to "clutter up" Title VII to entirely prevent its passage.5 2 However,
some scholars have argued that this was not the case.53 In any event,
since its inception, the "because of sex" provision has caused confusion
and disagreement among courts attempting to interpret the scope and
meaning of the phrase.
Title VII does more than proscribe discriminatory conduct; it pro-
vides a remedial scheme designed "to make persons whole for injuries
suffered on account of unlawful employment discrimination."" As dis-
48. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e [Section 701] (1964) (emphasis added).
49. See Holloway v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 566 F.2d 659, 662 (9th Cir. 1977), overrul-
ing recognized by Schwenk v. Hartford, 204 F.3d 1187 (9th Cir. 2000).
50. See 1964 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2355-2519.
51. See Harvard Law Review, supra note 32, at 1166.
52. See Harvard Law Review, supra note 32, at 1166 (citing 110 Cong. Rec. 2581 (1964)
(statement of Congresswoman Green)).
53. But see Michael Evan Gold, A Tale of Two Amendments: The Reasons Congress Added
Sex to Title VII and Their Implication for the Issue of Comparable Worth, 19 DuQ. L.
REV. 453, 453-54 (1981) (countering this characterization of the provision's history
and analyzing various positions and attributes toward prohibition of sex-based dis-
crimination).
54. Cosgrove v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 9 F.3d 1033, 1041 (2d Cir. 1993) (citing Alber-
marie Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 418 (1975)).
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cussed in Albermarle Paper Co. v. Moody," Title VII seeks to afford
"complete justice" for the personal harm suffered because of discrimina-
tion, as well as "necessary relief' for the economic harm that resulted
from discrimination." Title VII reflects a retrospective review and ac-
knowledgment of discriminatory practices throughout history, as well as
a prospective aim to discourage and eliminate discriminatory practices
in the future." As stated in Albermarle, "the court has not merely the
power but the duty to render a decree which will so far as possible elim-
inate the discriminatory effects of the past as well as bar like
discrimination in the future.""
Discrimination takes many forms. Generally, two types of discrim-
ination are actionable under Title VII: "disparate treatment" and
"disparate impact."" Disparate treatment discrimination occurs when
"the defendant had a discriminatory intent or motive" in taking adverse
employment action against an individual.60 On the other hand, disparate
impact discrimination occurs when "a facially neutral practice, adopted
without discriminatory intent [has] effects that are indistinguishable
from intentionally discriminatory practices."61 Stated another way, the
key distinction between disparate treatment and disparate impact dis-
crimination is the presence or absence of overt discriminatory intent
(disparate treatment discrimination possesses overt discriminatory intent
and disparate impact discrimination does not).
As is the case with numerous other statutes, with Title VII, a com-
plainant must exhaust administrative avenues when seeking relief before
turning to the courts. Once an aggrieved individual turns to the courts
for remedy, some requirements, like establishing standing to sue, remain
constant in any case, but the burdens of proof and other elements neces-
sary for the plaintiff to succeed with his or her claim differ depending
on whether the discrimination was "disparate treatment" or "disparate
impact.
If a plaintiff successfully proves a Title VII claim, and the court
finds that the employer discriminated against the individual, "the court
may enjoin the [employer] from engaging in such unlawful employment
practices and order such affirmative action as may be appropriate,"
55. 422 U.S. 405, 418 (1975).
56. See 422 U.S. at 418.
57. See 422 U.S. at 418.
58. See 422 U.S. at 418 (citing La. v. United States, 380 U.S. 145, 154 (1965)).
59. See generally Cosgrove, 9 F.3d 1033. Disparate impact discrimination was first recog-
nized by the Supreme Court in Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
60. See Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977, 986 (1988).
61. See Watson, 487 U.S. at 978.
62. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1988).
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including but not limited to "restatement or hiring of employees, with
or without back pay . . . or any other equitable relief as the court deems
appropriate." 3 For disparate treatment cases, courts may also order at-
torneys' fees and compensatory and punitive damages (up to certain
capped amounts) against the employer.6
Now that there has been consideration of Title VII's history, intent,
framework, text, and operation, a more detailed discussion of the issues
with Title VII's categorical approach will take place, utilizing the experi-
ence of transgender individuals as the foundation for examination.
II. FEDERAL CASE PRECEDENTS ILLUSTRATING THE FLAws OF
TITLE VII's CATEGORICAL APPROACH
In order to consider the flaws inherent in Title VII's categorical
framework and its effect on uncovered individuals, it is instructive to
consider how federal courts have treated one specific group of individu-
als: transgender persons. This Article examines discrimination against
transgender persons in employment because discrimination against
transgender individuals discretely articulates and exemplifies the flaws
with Title VII's current paradigm. Thus, a retrospective analysis of
transgender case precedent occurs here, followed in subsequent sections
by a prospective journey through the new proposed Employment Quali-
fications Approach in an attempt to understand where Title VII has
taken us and where the EQA could enable us to go in the future.
Discrimination takes many forms, and occurs for different, specific
reasons. These facets of discrimination can be sorted into several types,
which explain almost the entire spectrum of discriminatory conduct. In
sum, regardless of form, what is happening is that categorical discrimi-
nation results in an inability to see past an individual's personal
characteristics and realize the individual's true qualifications for em-
ployment. In broad strokes, discrimination (in employment or
otherwise) can be classified as: invidious, distracted, or misinformed.
The first type is invidious discrimination. In the context of
transgender persons, this presents itself as different and detrimental
treatment of transgender individuals compared to non-transgender
individuals solely because they are transgender. Another kind of discrim-
63. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) [Section 706] (1964).
64. See Kolstad v. Am. Dental Ass'n, 527 U.S. 526, 534 (1999) (citing 42 U.S.C.
§ 1981a(a)(1) (1991)).
65. For more information on the application of state law to sex discrimination in em-
ployment, see, e.g., Debra T. Landis, Annotation, Application of State Law to Sex
Discrimination in Employment, 87 A.L.R.3D 93 (1978).
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ination is that due to distraction, a focus on visible personal characteris-
tics that are unrelated and irrelevant to job ability or qualifications, but
that some employers are unable to see beyond. For example, distraction
discrimination might involve concerns regarding a transgender person's
appearance or physical presentation, or the effect that a transgender em-
ployee might have on other employees in bathroom or other workplace
situations. One other variety of discrimination occurs purely due to mis-
information or misconception. Discrimination because of
misinformation or misconception might include assumptions about a
transgender employee's health or sexual orientation-additional irrele-
vancies untied to job ability or performance. Invidious, distraction, and
misconception discrimination encompass the vast majority of discrimi-
nation against transgender employees in the workplace. These issues
afflict the transgender community in employment, but these troubles
vex other uncovered individuals as well, demonstrating the trials and
failures of Title VII in its attempt to regulate the wide array of discrimi-
nation in employment.
Thus far, courts have attempted to deal with employment discrimi-
nation against transgender individuals under Title VII's "because of sex"
provision. This has resulted in almost no success for the transgender vic-
tims of discrimination. Each of the cases discussed below illustrates a
way in which a court decided a case involving a transgender individual,
exposing and exemplifying different problems with Title VII's categori-
cal scheme and issues with Title VII's "because of sex" provision.
Title VII proscribes employment discrimination on several categori-
cal bases, including "because of ... sex."66 This seemingly straightforward
edict has been very challenging for courts to interpret. This may be due to
the lack of legislative history, intent, or discussion on the provision." This
difficulty may also be attributable to the wide diversity of identities on the
human sexuality spectrumi or, as the court put it in Schroer v. Billington:"
[t]he factual complexities that underlie human sexual identity
.... stem from real variations in how different components of
biological sexuality-chromosomal, gonadal, hormonal and
66. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (1964).
67. See Harvard Law Review, supra note 32, at 1166.
68. See Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual Trans and Intersex Equality, AusTuumN HumAN RIGHTS
COMM'N, http://www.humanrights.gov.aulhuman-rights/1gbti/index.html (noting a
wide variety of sex and gender identities, and the fact that "[lt]here are various legal,
social, medical and scientific opinions and theories about what constitutes sex and
what constitutes gender").
69. Schroer v. Billington, 424 F. Supp. 2d 203, 212-13 (D.D.C. 2006).
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neurological-interact with each other, and in turn, with so-
cial, psychological, and legal conceptions of gender.o
This Part discusses these challenges utilizing real-life case studies,
analyzing court decisions that have discussed and attempted to reckon
with the diverse spectrum of discriminatory activity against transgender
individuals. Courts have traditionally focused on three factors in inter-
preting the "because of sex" provision and deciding claims of sex-based
discrimination against transgender persons: (1) the lack of legislative
history surrounding the provision; (2) the "plain meaning" of the statute
(i.e. "sex" held to cover only biological males or biological females, indi-
viduals who were assigned a sex at birth and continue to identify with
that sex); and (3) congressional inaction (failure to adopt legislation that
adds gender identity or sexual orientation to the list of protected charac-
* * 71teristics) .
While numerous types of cases have discussed the treatment of
transgender individuals in cases involving discrimination "because of
sex," sex stereotyping cases represent the majority of Title VII cases in-
volving transgender individuals and are therefore the focus of this
section. Discussion of key federal court cases interpreting the "because
of sex" provision, as it applies to transgender individuals, proceeds be-
low.
A. Defining the "Because ofSex" Provision
The first federal court case to examine whether transgender dis-
crimination claims fall within the purview of Title VII's "because of sex"
provision, and the most prominent federal case on the question, was
Holloway v. Arthur Andersen & Co. 72 Ramona Holloway began work at
the Arthur Andersen firm as Robert Holloway.73 While working at the
firm, Ramona (then Robert) informed a supervisor of her intent to un-
dergo a gender transition. Holloway was advised to seek employment
elsewhere, where her transsexual status would be unknown and she
might be "happier."" At Holloway's request, her employee records were
70. Schroer 424 F. Supp. 2d at 212.
71. See Ulane v. E. Airlines, Inc., 742 F.2d 1081, 1085 (7th Cit. 1984); Holloway v.
Arthur Andersen & Co., 566 F.2d 659, 662 (9th Cir. 1977); Mary Kristen Kelly,
Note, (Trans)forming Traditional Interpretations of Title VII: "Because of Sex" and the
Transgender Dilemma, 17 DuKE J. GENDER L. & PoL'Y 219, 224 (2010).
72. Holloway v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 566 F.2d 659 (9th Cit. 1977).
73. Holloway, 566 F.2d at 661.
74. Holloway, 566 F.2d at 661.
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changed to reflect her post-transition name and soon after that, Hol-
loway was terminated." Holloway filed suit, arguing that discrimination
against her because she was a transsexual was unlawful discrimination
"because of sex" under Title VI.
With a cursory discussion of each, the Holloway court discussed all
three of the aforementioned factors in its decision: the scarcity of legisla-
tive guidance or history regarding the "because of sex" provision, a
"plain meaning" interpretation of "sex," and Congress's failure to adopt
legislation broadening the definition of "sex" within the provision. The
Holloway court relied on the "dearth of legislative history" on the "be-
cause of sex" provision77 to dismiss the idea that Congress could have
intended Title VII to protect employees discriminated against "because
of sex" for reasons other than their biological sex." Then, without giving
detailed consideration to other possible interpretations, the court nar-
rowly interpreted the "plain meaning" of the statute and concluded "that
Congress had only the traditional notions of 'sex' in mind" (i.e. biologi-
cal sex).7 1 Interestingly, the court did not define or support its assertion
regarding what constitutes a "traditional notion of 'sex."'o Finally, the
court used a lack of legislative activity on the issue as evidence that
"Congress has not shown any intent other than to restrict the term 'sex'
to its traditional meaning. . . . [T]his court will not expand Title VII's
application [to cover transsexual individuals] in the absence of congres-
sional mandate."' Thus, the Holloway court held that a "transsexual
individual's decision to undergo sex change surgery does not bring that
individual, nor transsexuals as a class, within the scope of Title VII. This
court refuses to extend the coverage of Title VII to situations that Con-
gress clearly did not contemplate."82 The decision signified the Holloway
court's refusal to extend Title VII protections to transsexuals because the
court deemed transsexual discrimination to be on account of gender, not
sex,"83 narrowly defining "sex" within Title VII.
75. Holloway, 566 F.2d at 661.
76. Holloway, 566 F.2d at 661.
77. Holloway, 566 F.2d at 662.
78. Holloway, 566 F.2d at 662.
79. Holloway, 566 F.2d at 662.
80. Holloway, 566 F.2d at 662.
81. Holloway, 566 F.2d at 663.
82. Holloway, 566 F.2d at 664.
83. See Schwenk v. Hartford, 204 F.3d 1187, 1201 (9th Cir. 2000).
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B. Sex Stereotyping Discrimination-Pre-Price
Waterhouse v. Hopkins
Several precedents have held that sex stereotyping claims, or claims
involving discrimination against an individual because he or she fails to
conform to gender stereotypes traditionally associated with the sex as-
signed to them at birth, fall under the umbrella of Title VII's "because of
sex" provision.
One of the first circuit courts to consider whether Title VII's "be-
cause of sex" protections applied to transgender employees was the
Eighth Circuit in Sommers v. Budget Mktg., Inc.84 Audra Sommers (for-
merly Timothy Cornish) was a clerical staff member at Budget
Marketing whose employment was terminated after it came to light that
Sommers was transgender."' Budget Marketing stated that Sommers was
terminated "because she misrepresented herself as an anatomical female
when she applied for the job . .. [and] the misrepresentation led to a
disruption of the company's work routine ... [F]emale employees indi-
cated they would quit if Sommers were permitted to use the restroom
facilities assigned to female personnel.",6 Sommers exhausted available
administrative remedies and brought suit, alleging discrimination "be-
cause of sex" under Title VII. Sommers argued for an expansion of the
definition of "sex" under Title VII, beyond the "plain meaning of the
term."" In a cursory three-page opinion, the Eighth Circuit affirmed
summary judgment against Sommers, citing the "plain meaning" of
"sex," the lack of obvious congressional intent to define the term to in-
clude transgender persons and privacy concerns as the reasons for its
holding."
The Seventh Circuit examined whether transgender individuals are
covered under Title VII's "because of sex" provision in the notable and
oft-cited decision Uane v. Eastern Airlines, Inc.o The Uane decision
represented the first time that a circuit court overruled a lower court
decision in which the lower court recognized that discrimination against
84. Sommers v. Budget Mktg., Inc., 667 F.2d 748 (8th Cir. 1982).
85. Sommers, 667 F.2d at 748.
86. Sommers, 667 F.2d at 748-49.
87. Sommers, 667 F.2d at 749.
88. Sommers, 667 F.2d at 749.
89. Sommers, 667 F.2d at 749-50.
90. Ulane v. E. Airlines, Inc., 742 F.2d 1081 (7th Cir. 1984) (herein referred to as
"Ulane").
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an employee because they are transgender constituted discrimination
"because of sex" under Title VII.
Kenneth Ulane was a male airline pilot who was fired after begin-
ning a gender transition to become Karen Ulane.9 2 Ulane was
terminated by the employer airline despite the facts that the State of Il-
linois issued Karen Ulane a revised birth certificate indicating a-female
gender and the Federal Aviation Administration certified Ulane for
flight status as a female.93 In reversing the lower court decision that held
for the plaintiff, the Seventh Circuit remarked on the incomplete nature
of gender transitioning that transsexuals undergo (i.e. inability to alter
genetic makeup or fertility)" and the distinctions between sexual orien-
tation and gender identity, among other matters. The Seventh Circuit
shrouded itself in textualism," pronouncing that a "maxim of statutory
construction that, unless otherwise defined, words should be given their
ordinary, common meaning" decided the question:
The phrase in Title VII prohibiting discrimination based on
sex, in its plain meaning, implies that it is unlawful to discrim-
inate against women because they are women and against men
because they are men. The words of Title VII do not outlaw
discrimination against a person who has a sexual identity dis-
order, i.e., a person born with a male body who believes
himself to be female, or a person born with a female body who
believes herself to be male; a prohibition against discrimina-
tion based on an individual's sex is not synonymous with a
prohibition against discrimination based on an individual's
sexual identity disorder or discontent with the sex into which
they were born."
91. Ulane v. E. Airlines, Inc., 581 F. Supp. 821, 825 (N.D. Ill. 1983), rev'd, 742 F.2d
1081 (7th Cir. 1984). Interestingly, the district court held that although "the term
'sex' does not comprehend 'sexual preference,' . . . it does comprehend 'sexual identi-
ty.' See Ulane, 742 F.2d at 1084 (discussing the lower court decision).
92. Ulane, 742 F.2d at 1082.
93. Ulane, 742 F.2d at 1083.
94. Ulane, 742 F.2d at 1083 nn.3- 6 .
95. See, e.g., Jillian Todd Weiss, Transgender Identity, Textualism, and the Supreme Court:
What Is the "Plain Meaning" of "Sex" in Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964?, 18
TEMP. POL. & Civ. Rrs. L. REv. 573, 575-80 (2009) (discussing the way in which
courts have employed textualism in this manner in Title VII cases involving
transgender persons).
96. Ulane, 742 F.2d at 1085.
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As did the Ninth Circuit in Holloway,7 the Seventh Circuit in
U/ane also noted and relied on the "dearth of legislative history" on the
provision, finding that the absence of legislative history "strongly rein-
forces the view that the section means nothing more than its plain
language implies."" Also, as the Holloway court did,"' the U/ane court
placed significant weight on Congress's failure to amend Title VII to
prohibit discrimination based upon other bases, such as gender identi-
ty.oo The Seventh Circuit also cloaked itself in originalism and cited a
duty to refrain from so-called "judicial activism" in refusing to liberally
construe Title VII, although it is a remedial statute.'o'
97. Holloway v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 566 F.2d 659, 662 (9th Cir. 1977).
98. Ulane, 742 F.2d at 1085 ("The total lack of legislative history supporting the sex
amendment coupled with the circumstances of the amendment's adoption clearly in-
dicates that Congress never considered nor intended that this 1964 legislation apply
to anything other than the traditional concept of sex. Had Congress intended more,
surely the legislative history would have at least mentioned its intended broad cover-
age of homosexuals, transvestites, or transsexuals, and would no doubt have sparked
an interesting debate. There is not the slightest suggestion in the legislative record to
support an all-encompassing interpretation."); see also Ulane, 742 F.2d at 1086 ("If
Congress believes that transsexuals should enjoy the protection of Title VII, it may so
provide.").
99. See Holloway, 566 F.2d at 663.
100. U/ane, 742 F.2d at 1086 ("Congress has continued to reject [such] amendments even
after courts have specifically held that Title VII does not protect transsexuals from
discrimination. Compare H.R. 1454, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. (1982) (hearing held on
Jan. 27, 1982) with Sommers v. Budget Mktg., Inc., 667 F.2d 748, 750 (8th Cir.
Jan. 8, 1982) (per curiam); Holloway v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 556 F.2d 659,
662-63 (9th Cir.1977); Powell v. Read's, Inc., 436 F. Supp. 369, 371 (D.
Md.1977); Grossman v. Board of Educ., 11 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1196,
1199 (D.N.J.1975), affid mem., 538 F.2d 319 (3rd Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 897,
97 S. Ct. 261, 50 L. Ed. 2d 181 (1976); Voyles v. Ralph K. Davies Med. Ctr., 403 F.
Supp. 456, 457 (N.D. Cal.1975), affd mem., 570 F.2d 354 (9th Cir. 1978); see also
United States v. PATCO, 653 F.2d 1134, 1138 (7th Cir. 1981) (Congress is pre-
sumed to know the law and judicial interpretations of it); United States v. Ambrose,
740 F.2d 505 at 514 (7th Cir. 1984) (Wood, J., concurring and dissenting)
(same).").
101. Ulane, 742 F.2d at 1086 ("Although the maxim that remedial statutes should be
liberally construed is well recognized, that concept has reasonable bounds beyond
which a court cannot go without transgressing the prerogatives of Congress. In our
view, to include transsexuals within the reach of Title VII far exceeds mere statutory
interpretation.... For us to now hold that Title VII protects transsexuals would take
us out of the realm of interpreting and reviewing and into the realm of legislating. See
Gunnison v. Comm'r, 461 F.2d 496, 499 (7th Cir. 1972) (it is for the legislature,
not the courts, to expand the class of people protected by a statute. This we must not
and will not do.").
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C. Sex Stereotyping Discrimination-Hopkins and Beyond
The tide turned in 1989, with the U.S. Supreme Court's decision
in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins.102 For the first time, the Court recognized
sex stereotyping as actionable sex discrimination under Title VII's "be-
cause of sex" provision. 03 In the decisive case, Ann Hopkins, the sole
woman being considered for partnership with the firm that year, was
denied partnership.0o Partners who reviewed Hopkins's work perfor-
mance cited her "macho," "overly aggressive" nature among other traits,
and one partner even stated that Hopkins needed "a course at charm
school."' 5 Another partner suggested that Hopkins should "walk more
femininely, talk more femininely, dress more femininely, wear make-up,
have her hair styled, and wear jewelry" in order to make partner, and
that these reasons were among the reasons Hopkins was not made part-
ner that year.'06 The Supreme Court found that Hopkins was not
promoted, at least in part, because she failed to conform to feminine sex
stereotypes. 07 The Court held that an employer that acts on the basis of
a belief about what is appropriate for one sex has acted in violation of
Title VII's prohibition of discrimination "because of sex."'0o It became
evident that the tide had turned for sex-based discrimination under Title
VII with the Court's statement, "we are beyond the day when an em-
ployer could evaluate employees by assuming or insisting that they
matched the stereotype associated with their group."' 9 Although the
opinion did not involve a transgender person, the Hopkins opinion is
relevant and noteworthy because it manifested the sex stereotyping theo-
ry of sex discrimination, and it marked one of the first successful uses of
the theory by a gender non-conforming plaintiff to obtain relief. This is
important because transgender persons are discriminated against precise-
ly because they fail to conform to the employer's limited idea of what a
"man" or "woman" should be.
102. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989).
103. Kelly, supra note 71, at 226.
104. Hopkins, 490 U.S. at 233.
105. Hopkins, 490 U.S. at 235 (quoting Defendant's Exh. 30, Hopkins v. Price Water-
house, 618 F. Supp. 1109, 1113 (D.D.C. 1985), and Defendant's Exh. 27
respectively).
106. Hopkins, 490 U.S. at 235 (quoting Hopkins v. Price Waterhouse, 618 F. Supp 1109,
1117 (D.D.C. 1985)).
107. See Hopkins, 490 U.S. at 251, 255-56.
108. See Hopkins, 490 U.S. at 251.
109. See Hopkins, 490 U.S. at 251.
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The Ninth Circuit reversed course after Hopkins and overruled its
prior Holloway decision in Schwenk v. Hartford."o In Schwenk, a
transgender prisoner (formerly Douglas Schwenk, now Crystal
Schwenk) sued under state law and 42 U.S.C. § 1983 after repeated
sexual assaults by a guard."' Schwenk alleged several claims, including a
claim of discrimination because Schwenk was a pre-operative transsexu-
al." 2 Citing the Hopkins precedent, and discussing its interpretation of
Title VII, the Ninth Circuit stated clearly:
The initial judicial approach taken in cases such as Holloway
has been overruled by the logic and language of Price Water-
house. In Price Waterhouse, which was decided after Holloway
and Ulane, the Supreme Court held that Title VII barred not
just discrimination based on the fact that Hopkins was a
woman, but also discrimination based on the fact that she
failed "to act like a woman"-that is, to conform to socially-
constructed gender expectations."
The Schwenk court went on to note that under the Hopkins analy-
sis, discrimination "because of sex" occurs when, "in the mind of the
perpetrator the discrimination is related to the sex of the victim.""' Be-
cause the guard's discrimination was based on his belief that Schwenk
was a man who failed to conform to stereotypes about how men should
act, the guard's discrimination was "because of sex.""' As the Ninth Cir-
cuit declared, after Hopkins, "'sex' under Title VII encompasses both
sex-meaning the biological differences between men and women-and
gender. Discrimination because one fails to act in the way expected of a
man or woman is forbidden under Title VII."'16 Thus, under Schwenk,
transgender people should be protected from sex-based discrimination
under Title VII.
Forty years after the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and Ti-
tle VII, Smith v. City of Salem' " represents one of the first times that a
federal court of appeals ruled in favor of a transgender plaintiff with
their Title VII sex stereotyping claim. Jimmie Smith was a lieutenant in
110. Schwenk v. Hartford, 204 F.3d 1187 (9th Cir. 2000).
111. Schwenk, 204 F.3d at 1192-94.
112. Schwenk, 204 F.3d at 1192-94.
113. Schwenk, 204 F.3d at 1202 (citing Hopkins, 490 U.S. at 240).
114. Schwenk, 204 F.3d at 1202.
115. See Schwenk, 204 F.3d at 1202.
116. Schwenk, 204 F.3d at 1202.
117. Smith v. City of Salem, 378 F.3d 566 (6th Cir. 2004).
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the Salem Fire Department for seven years."' Smith was assigned a male
sex at birth, but always identified as female and was eventually diag-
nosed with Gender Identity Disorder ("GID"),"9 "which the American
Psychiatric Association characterizes as a disjunction between an indi-
vidual's sexual organs and sexual identity."l20 After her GID diagnosis,
Smith began expressing a female gender identity on a full-time basis,
including at work.12' As a result, Smith's co-workers made derogatory
remarks, including that Jimmie's "appearance and mannerisms were not
'masculine enough.' ,122 Smith notified her superiors of her condition
and the work situation, and her superiors violated confidentiality prom-
ises and devised plans designed to cause Smith to resign.123 One party
involved called the Defendants' scheme a "witch hunt." 24 Smith was
suspended from her position and then sued as a male with GID, alleging
Title VII sex discrimination and retaliation claims among others.125 The
district court dismissed Smith's claims, stating that Smith was alleging
sex stereotyping discrimination when in reality, Smith's claim was one of
transgender discrimination, a claim "for which Title VII does not pro-
vide protection." 26 The Sixth Circuit reversed the lower court decision,
holding that under Hopkins, gender discrimination (including transsex-
ual discrimination) was prohibited by Title VII's proscription against
discrimination "because of sex." 27 The Smith court went further though,
finding that Holloway, Ulane and other precedents had all erroneously
based their decisions on the idea that Title VII's "because of sex" dis-
128
crimination provision did not include gender discrimination, too.
Moreover, the Sixth Circuit astutely noted that in such decisions,
"courts superimpose classifications such as 'transsexual' on a plaintiff,
and then legitimize discrimination based on the plaintiff's gender non-
conformity by formalizing the non-conformity into an ostensibly
unprotected classification."'2 ' However, after Hopkins, an employer who
discriminates against a woman for being too "macho" should be liable
for discrimination "because of sex," just as much as an employer who
118. Smith, 378 F.3d at 568.
119. See Gary S. Mogel, 25 Am. JUR. PROOF OF FACTS 3d 415 (1994) (discussing cases on
employment discrimination because of GID or gender dysphoria).
120. Smith, 378 F.3d at 568.
121. Smith, 378 F.3d at 568.
122. See Smith, 378 F.3d at 568.
123. See Smith, 378 F.3d at 569.
124. See Smith, 378 F.3d at 569.
125. See Smith, 378 F.3d at 569.
126. Smith, 378 F.3d at 571.
127. See Smith, 378 F.3d at 571-72.
128. See Smith, 378 F.3d at 573.
129. Smith, 378 F.3d at 574.
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discriminates against a man for not being "macho enough."o The Smith
decision was the first successful case involving a transgender individual's
sex stereotyping discrimination claim under Title VII. Unfortunately,
while Smith was not the last successful decision of its kind, it is one of
very few successful decisions on the issue.'
Since Hopkins, there have been numerous setbacks with efforts to
secure transgender employment protections under Title VII's "because
of sex" provision. One such setback occurred in the case of Etsitty v.
Utah Transit Authority.'32 Krystal (formerly Michael) Etsitty applied for
and accepted a job offer as a male, although she was undergoing a gen-
der transition in her private life and had been for some time prior to her
employment as a bus driver with the Utah Transit Authority ("UTA"). 33
Etsitty eventually informed her supervisor of her gender transition and
intent to present as female (Krystal) at work."' Initially, Etsitty's supervi-
sor was supportive and Etsitty wore makeup, jewelry and other feminine
items to work.'3 ' Etsitty also started using women's public restrooms
while on duty."' However, once the UTA operations manager became
aware of the situation, he met with Etsitty and expressed concern over
Etsitty's use of female restrooms while still biologically (gonadally) male,
and the potential liability this presented for the UTA." Etsitty was
placed on mandatory administrative leave before being terminated, and
informed that she could reapply for rehire after completing sex reas-
signment surgery.1' Etsitty filed a suit asserting Equal Protection Clause
and Title VII gender stereotyping claims.'39 Despite the Hopkins prece-
dent, the trial court found and the Tenth Circuit affirmed a finding that
Title VII's "because of sex" provision did not cover transsexual employ-
ees. 40 The Tenth Circuit relied on the Seventh Circuit's Ulane precedent
and cited that decision and the "plain meaning" approach to defining
sex in support of its decision."' Thus, while there have been significant
130. See Smith, 378 F.3d at 574.
131. Kelly, supra note 71, at 229-31.
132. Etsitty v. Utah Transit Auth., 502 F.3d 1215 (10th Cir. 2007).
133. Etsitty, 502 F.3d at 1218-19.
134. Etsitty, 502 F.3d at 1219.
135. Etsitty, 502 F.3d at 1219.
136. Etsitty, 502 F.3d at 1219.
137. Etsitty, 502 F.3d at 1219.
138. Etsitty, 502 F.3d at 1219.
139. Etsitty v. Utah Transit Auth., No. 2:04CV616 DS, 2005 WL 1505610, at *1 (D.
Utah June 24, 2005).
140. Etsitty, 502 F.3d at 1218.
141. Etsitty, 502 F.3d at 1222 ("[lhere is nothing in the record to support the conclusion
that the plain meaning of'sex' encompasses anything more than male and female. In
light of the traditional binary conception of sex, transsexuals may not claim protec-
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strides in Title VII "because of sex" protections for transgender persons,
there have also been disappointments and reversions to pre-Hopkins rea-
soning along the way.
As these cases demonstrate, discrimination's various forms (charac-
terized by employers' invidious, distracted, or misinformed motives),
operate in a nuanced way that Title VII's categorical approach is not
equipped to handle. The categorical approach worked reasonably well
for years, eradicating some and mitigating other employment discrimi-
nation. However, employment discrimination occurring today is not the
same as employment discrimination occurring in 1964, or even 1991.
Employment discrimination today tends to be much less overt, and its
lines are less clearly-defined than discrimination was in the past. It is no
longer always possible to say for certain that an employee did not receive
a job because they fit into one and only one category, or possessed a sin-
gle characteristic (e.g. being a member of a certain racial group); and
unlike in 1964, the employer will not always be so explicit about their
reasoning. Today, an employer might generally cite a job applicant's "ap-
pearance" as their reason for not hiring the candidate, when they really
chose not to hire the candidate because they are transgender, and/or are
a single parent, and/or because of their political party affilation. A dis-
criminatory employer might also make an adverse employment decision,
such as failing to promote a candidate, for one stated reason (e.g. an un-
friendly attitude), when really the reason was based on a category-based
stereotype such as race or sex. Employers have had nearly fifty years to
become aware of all of Title VII's nooks and crannies, faults and weak
points, and have learned how to aptly navigate around them. All the
while, discrimination occurs with assistance from sometimes witting and
other times unwitting courts, which cite judicial restraint and a lack of
congressional guidelines as the reason to deny equal employment protec-
tions to the most vulnerable and needy employees, even under a broad,
remedial statute. Discrimination today operates in a fashion such that
adding categories and working within a categorical framework like Title
VII will never be sufficient to effectively combat discrimination. Title
VII achieved positive results for many years. However, times have
changed, and revision to the scheme is necessary in order to keep up
with the changing face of employment discrimination and the changing
character of employee candidates. The next Part of this Article addresses
the issues with Title VII's categorical approach in greater detail.
tion under Title VII from discrimination based solely on their status as a transsexu-
al."). See Terry S. Kogan, Transsexuals in Public Restrooms: Law, Cultural Geography
and Etsitty v. Utah Transit Auth., 18 TEMP. POL. & COv. RTs. L. REv. 673 (2009)
(discussing the Etsitty matter and transgender persons' use of restrooms).
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III. ISSUES WITH TITLE VII's CATEGORICAL APPROACH
As of the time this Article was written, it has been forty-seven years
since the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and Title VII. This is
significant for several reasons. One reason is because of the relatively
great amount of time that employers have known of these statutes and
their requirements. Another reason is that although employment non-
discrimination efforts have come a long way for many groups in those
years, for groups like transgender individuals there has been little to no
improvement in equal employment opportunities or non-discrimination
protections. To be clear, Title VII is important legislation that has done
much good and continues to strive for lofty, admirable goals. But Title
VII is also plagued by shortcomings and has largely failed the
transgender community, among others, as is.
This section discusses some of the shortcomings of Title VII, utiliz-
ing transgender employment discrimination as the foundation for
analysis. The flaws intrinsic to Title VII's categorical approach include:
resentment toward protected class groups; categorical under-inclusiveness
at the group and individual levels; valuation and dehumanization of indi-
viduals; the use of the categories as swords and shields to deny and afford
protections at the whim of those wielding the power to define the cate-
gories; and Title VII's categorical structure frequently resulting in
immense costs to employers. Each flaw is discussed in turn.
A. Resentment Toward Protected Class Groups
The esteemed U.S. Supreme Court Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes
once said, "the longer we live, the more we find we are like other per-
sons." Unfortunately, it seems Americans have not lived long enough yet
to fully observe all of the similarities among themselves. A significant
body of social science research has studied Americans' focus on "the dif-
ference between classes,"l4 2 and recognized a sense of resentment on the
part of employees and employers' 43 toward those individuals traditional-
ly protected by Title VII's categories.
142. See Brett Ira Johnson, Casenotes & Comments, Six of One, Half-Dozen of Another:
Mullin v. Raytheon Co. as a Representative of Federal Circuit Courts Erroneously Dis-
tinguishing the ADAE from Title VII Regarding Disparate Impact Liability, 36 IDAHO
L. REv. 303, 343 n.260 (2000).
143. See also Deana A. Pollard, Unconscious Bias and Self-Critical Analysis: The Case for a
Qualfied Evidentiary Equal Employment Opportunity Privilege, 74 WASH. L. REV.
913, 933 (1999) ("Title VII's convoluted analytical history ... has contributed to-
ward resentment toward Title VII plaintiffs because it is confusing and fails to
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Some social science scholars argue that the mere existence of
"groupness," or the differentiation and classification of individuals into
groups based on certain possessed characteristics, "exacerbates and gen-
erates various types of intergroup biases."I' One scholar analyzed
various studies on point and found that the practical effects of "dividing
people along group-based lines will 'cause people to favor ingroup
members in the allocation of rewards, in the evaluation of performance,
in memory for positive versus negative behaviors, and in the attribution
of success or failure.'""45 Once "the concept of 'groupness' is introduced,
subjects perceive members of their group as more similar to them, and
members of different [groups] as more different from them, than when
those same persons are simply viewed as noncategorized individuals."
These sorts of stratifications predictably lead some to resent individuals
who are not members of the same group, and to misperceive their pro-
tections, which some would call "special rights."' 6 There is such "group
bias" resentment of Title VII protected classes happening today,"' and it
is invidious, widespread and not always superficially apparent. As Su-
preme Court Justice Thomas has recognized, this group bias and
resentment is harmful to those in the protected groups and those out-
side of them' because granting preference in employment based on
instruct defendants on how to avoid liability"); see generally Jessica Fink, Unintended
Consequences: How Antidiscrimination Litigation Increases Group Bias in Employer-
Defendants, 38 N.M. L. REv. 333 (2008).
144. See, e.g., Fink, supra note 143, at 342 (discussing various social science scholars' re-
search on point) (citing Linda Hamilton Krieger, The Content of Our Categories: A
Cognitive Bias Approach to Discrimination and Equal Employment Opportunity, 47
STAN. L. REv. 1161, 1186-1209 (1995)).
145. Fink, supra note 143, at 342 (citing Linda Hamilton Krieger, Civil Rights Perestroika:
Intergroup Relations After AffirmativeAction, 86 CAL. L. REv. 1251, 1274-75 (1998)).
146. See, e.g., Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 640-42 (1996) (Rehnquist, C.J., Scalia,
Thomas JJ., dissenting) (discussing the rights of members of the LGBT community
in a manner reflecting group bias); Richard Thompson Ford, Are All Civil Rights Spe-
cial Privileges Now?, SLATE (July 2, 2009, 1:19 PM), http://www.slate.com/id/
2222092.
147. See, e.g., Lawrence Jones, Dems Advance Bill to Grant Special Workplace Rights to Ho-
mosexuals, THE CHRISTIAN POST (Oct. 19, 2007, 11:51 AM), http://www.
christianpost.com/article/20071019/dems-advance-bill-to-grant-special-workplace-rights-
to-homosexuals.
148. See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 240-41 (1995) (Thomas, J.,
concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (asserting that programs granting
preference in employment based on membership in protected group(s) "undermine
the moral basis of the equal protection principle . . . [a principle that] reflects our Na-
tion's understanding that such classifications ultimately have a destructive impact on
the individual and our society"). In his opinion, Justice Thomas further recognized
that such classifications and preference programs based on them (i.e. affirmative ac-
tion) "teaches many that because of chronic and apparently immutable handicaps,
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membership in a protected group "undermine[s] the moral basis of the
equal protection principle . .. reflect[ing] our Nation's understanding
that such classifications ultimately have a destructive impact on the in-
dividual and our society." Thus, in an unfortunate turn of irony, Title
VII's categorical approach, which classifies and divides individuals ac-
cording to their characteristic differences, may actually cause and worsen
discrimination in the workplace based on those characteristics-the very
discrimination Title VII aims to eliminate.'
B. Motives and Maneuvering
The saying goes "where there is a will, there is way." Unfortunately,
even after the enactment of Title VII, numerous amendments and hun-
dreds of case opinions interpreting and refining Title VII's provisions,
employers who seek to discriminate against employees still find ways to
do so, and get away with it. Employers have had nearly fifty years under
Title VII. By now, most employers are "sufficiently savvy" to maneuver
through Title VII to discriminate if they seek to do so, and congressional
machinery is not able to completely prevent them.' So long as employ-
ers promulgate and enforce policies that "appear credible and lacking in
animus," then courts are usually "reluctant to second-guess" them.'
The way in which employers maneuver around Title VII protections
and other problems with the class-based nature of Title VII are discussed
in turn.
One problem with the class categories of Title VII is that the struc-
ture delineates objective standards that are ill-equipped to handle the
subjective nature of employment discrimination. Title VII proscribes
discrimination against individuals for membership in certain classes-an
objective standard. However, Title VII fails to ensure a way to accurately
ascertain the basis on which an employer made an employment deci-
sion, which is decidedly subjective. 5 2 This can result in an end-run
minorities cannot compete with them without their patronizing indulgence. Inevita-
bly, such programs engender attitudes of superiority or, alternatively, provoke
resentment among those who believe that they have been wronged by the govern-
ment's use of [class characteristics]." See id. at 241.
149. See Linda Hamilton Krieger, The Content of Our Categories: A Cognitive Bias Ap-
proach to Discrimination and Equal Employment Opportunity, 47 STAN. L. REv. 1161,
1191-92 (1995) (footnote omitted).
150. See Marc Rosenblum, The Prerogative to Downsize-A Commentary on Blumrosen,
et. aL, 2 EMP. RTs. & EMP. POL'YJ. 417, 436 (1998).
151. See id.
152. Scholars have recognized that subjective employment decisions can be based on cov-
ert discrimination with other justifications. "In the early years ... of Title VII, courts
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around Title VII protections for those discriminatory employers savvy
enough to do the maneuvering and who offer a lawful justification for
an unlawful employment action. Although Title VII provides mecha-
nisms for dealing with intentional discrimination based on mixed
motives, this is insufficient to prevent maneuvering by employers in-
tent on discriminating.
To illustrate the way in which an employer intent on discriminating
can maneuver, it is useful to consider a hypothetical. For example, as-
sume that an employer is interviewing candidates for a position. For the
sake of simplicity, assume that there are only two candidates: a Black gay
man with tattoos and a white heterosexual man who is a registered
member of the Republican party. Further assume that both candidates
are equally qualified for the position. Title VII proscribes discrimination
"because of .. . race." An employer knows that they cannot make an
employment decision on the basis of the applicants' races. However, the
employer also likely knows that Title VII does not prohibit employment
discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation or appearance (among
numerous other bases). If the employer seeks to discriminate against the
Black applicant because he is Black, the employer can do so and evade
Title VII's protections-the employer merely needs to make it appear
that the employment decision was on a basis or bases not covered by
Title VII. The employer can claim, and it would be nearly impossible to
establish otherwise (especially at the interviewing stage of employment),
that the employer discriminated against the Black applicant not because
he was Black, but because he was gay, or because of his appearance. Even
if the employer subjectively made the employment decision "because of
race," the employer is permitted to make the employment decision on
were dealing with cases involving overt discrimination[, not] ... more subtle forms of
discrimination caused by conscious or unconscious stereotypes and prejudices....
Griggs was one of the first cases to address more subtle forms of discrimination." See
R. Scott Davies & Gregory J. Stenmor, Disparate Impact Analysis in Subjective Em-
ployment Decisions: Watson v. Fort Worth Bank, 52 ED. LAw REP. 9, 10 (1989).
153. Cases of intentional discrimination under Title VII consist of one of two types (or a
combination of the two): pretext cases or mixed motives cases. Pretext cases are those
in which the defendant's offered reason for the employment action is not true, but ra-
ther is a pretext for discrimination. Mixed motives cases are those in which the
defendant's stated reason for the employment action is only one of the reasons for the
action, and one of the other motivating reasons behind the decision was the plaintiffs
membership in a class protected from discrimination under Title VII. See Strate v.
Midwest Bankcentre, Inc., 398 F.3d 1011, 1017-18 (8th Cit. 2005). Whether the
intentional discrimination claim is based on pretext or mixed motives influences the
standards of liability and available remedies. See Richard T. Seymour, Current Evi-
dentiary Problems in Employment Cases, SP003 ALI-ABA 1101, 1116 (July 24-26,
2008) (discussing different types of claims and cases, citing Strate, 398 F.3d at 1017-
18).
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the other two bases, neither of which are protected from discrimination
by Title VII, and the employer's discrimination is lawful. There is a mul-
titude of imaginable examples like this one that evidences this
shortcoming with Title VII's categorical approach.
While it is true that there is a mixed motives analysis under Title
VII, designed specifically to deal with such situations, it is not able to
ensure completely that situations like the hypothetical above do not oc-
cur. Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa " clarified the mixed motives analysis
after Hopkins and discussed Section 107 of the Civil Rights Act of
1991,'5 which amended Title VII to cover mixed motives cases. As
amended, Title VII states in relevant part: "an unlawful employment
practice is established when the complaining party demonstrates that
race, color, religion, sex, or national origin was a motivating factor for
any employment practice, even though other factors also motivated the
practice." However, as previously substantiated by "Hypothetical A,"
this demonstration is not always possible or simple to make, and what
constitutes a sufficient "demonstration" warranting a mixed motives in-
struction varies from court to court.'17  Even if a plaintiff does
successfully prove that an impermissible basis was among the mixed mo-
tives behind the discriminatory employment action, the employer can
limit the remedies available to the plaintiff by demonstrating that it
would have reached the same decision absent the discrimination. In
"Hypothetical A" above, if the employer conducting the application
process disliked both Blacks and gays, and would have refused to hire
the applicant on either basis, the employer can still escape or limit liabil-
ity. This is because he would have made the same decision (not to hire
the applicant) on a basis not prohibited by Title VII (i.e. that the appli-
cant was gay) because the plaintiff will likely be unable to make a
sufficient "demonstration" about the employer's impermissible race-
based motivation for the employment decision.'18 Thus, this flaw in
Title VII's categorical approach remains.
154. 539 U.S. 90, 94 (2003).
155. 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1991).
156. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m) (1991).
157. See Tyler v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 958 F.2d 1176, 1183 (2d Cir. 1992) ("[The
various circuits have about as many definitions for 'direct evidence' as they do em-
ployment discrimination cases."); see also John Valery White, The Irrational Turn in
Employment Discrimination Law: Slouching Toward a Unified Approach to Civil Rights
Law, 53 MERCER L. REv. 709, 803 (2002) ("[T]here exists no definition of discrimi-
nation to allow the plaintiff to prove or defendant to disprove.... [Tihe parties
always face uncertainty that, not only might their definition differ from that of the
other party or the judge, but it might differ from the jury's.").
158. See White, supra note 157. In disparate treatment cases,
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Even if it were simple to consistently determine an employer's true
motivations behind a given employment decision under the mixed mo-
tives provision of Title VII, transgender employees would still be
susceptible to another type of "mixed motives" problem. In order to dis-
cern whether discriminatory action was based on a permissible or
impermissible basis, some courts separate employment practices into
those involving mutable characteristics and those involving immutable
characteristics,'" and hold that only immutable traits are protected from
discrimination under Title VII.'"o This is problematic for transgender
individuals and others on the LGBTQIA spectrum because there is
not widespread agreement about whether gender identity is (or other
characteristics of LGBTQIA persons are) immutable (i.e., that gender
identity is innate but later brought to the surface by way of surgery,
hormones or other measures), or if gender identity is mutable (a
choice).16 2 So long as the mutability-immutability debate over gender
identity and other currently unprotected characteristics continues, and
[a]ssuming the plaintiff can show pretext, the difficult part of the case has
only just begun. . . . [Proving] discriminatory intent becomes a significant
and shifting hurdle. . .. [T]he plaintiff might seek evidence that the situa-
tion resembles [other discriminatory episodes]; or ... pursue evidence that
the particular decision maker harbored prejudiced views.
See id. at 776. None of this would likely be easy for a plaintiff.
159. See Diana Elkind, Comment, The Constitutional Implications ofBathroom Access Based
on Gender Identity: An Examination of Recent Developments Paving the Way for the
Next Frontier ofEqual Protection, 9 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 895, 901 (2007) (distinguish-
ing Supreme Court precedents on sexual orientation as inapplicable to transgender
persons, because sexual orientation is behavioral but gender identity is physically and
psychologically immutable); Ken Nakasu Davison, The Mixed-Race Experience:
Treatment of Racially Miscategorized Individuals Under Title VII, 12 ASIAN L.J. 161,
164 (2005) (arguing that even race may not be immutable) (citing Peter Brandon
Bayer, Mutable Characteristics and the Definition of Discrimination Under Title VII,
20 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 769, 771 (1987)).
160. See generaly Roberto J. Gonzales, Cultural Rights and the Immutability Requirement in
Disparate Impact Doctrine, 55 STAN. L. REV. 2195, 2218 (2003) (citing Sandoval v.
Hagan, 197 F.3d 484 (11th Cir. 1999), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Alexander v.
Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275 (2001); Garcia v. Gloor, 618 F.2d 264 (5th Cir. 1980)).
161. "LGBTQIA" is an acronym which stands for: lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender,
queer or questioning, intersex, or asexual. Even this lengthy acronym, which incorpo-
rates the majority of the "queer" community, does not include all groups within the
queer community. See LGBTQIA Glossary, UNv. OF CAL., DAvis LESBIAN GAY
BisExuAL TRANSGENDER REs. CTR., http://1gbcenter.ucdavis.eduligbt-education/
lgbtqia-glossary.
162. This is often most problematic in disparate impact cases. See generally Gonzales, supra
note 160, at 2218 (citing Sandoval v. Hagan, 197 F.3d 484 (11th Cir. 1999), rev'd
on other grounds sub nom. Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275 (2001); Garcia v.
Gloor, 618 F.2d 264 (5th Cir. 1980)).
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courts utilize this analysis, transgender people and others will remain
unprotected under Title VII.
Thus, Title VII is flawed in that it fails to protect all employees, in-
cluding transgender persons, from employers discriminating via various
types of mixed motives or maneuvering. Furthermore, because employ-
ers promulgate and enforce policies that appear facially neutral, courts
refuse to question those employers' motives or actions. The consequence
is that savvy discriminators continue to skate through the gaping holes
in Title VII protections, and individuals suffer as a result.
C Categorical Under-Inclusiveness
At least one scholar adjudged Title VII and similar civil rights laws
"irrationally underinclusive" because "[r] ather than according civil rights
protection to all individuals under all applicable circumstances, the stat-
utes protect limited groups of individuals." 63 "[There is] a substantial
body of judicial decisions and EEOC precedent holding that Title VII
affords employees the right to work in an environment free from dis-
criminatory intimidation, ridicule, and insult," but only those in
enumerated classes. 64
The under-inclusive nature of Title VII's categories is threefold:
(1) at the group level, Title VII classes are under-inclusive because the
categories only afford non-discrimination protections to some categories
of persons on certain bases (e.g. protecting against discrimination be-
cause of race but not marital status); (2) at the individual level, Title VII
classes are under-inclusive because even some individuals who are mem-
bers of protected classes are excluded from non-discrimination
protections by definition or court interpretation;6 and (3) at the indi-
163. See Bayer, supra note 13, at 52.
164. See Bayer, supra note 13, at 53 (citing Meritor Say. Bank v. Vinson, 106 S. Ct. 2399,
2405 (1986)).
165. See, e.g., Spirides v. Reinhardt, 613 F.2d 826, 829 (D.C. Cit. 1979) (interpreting
Title VII protections for "individuals 'employed by an employer'" to exclude inde-
pendent contractors, even if they would otherwise qualify for protections). In
particular, the exclusion of independent contractors from Title VII protections dis-
proportionately affects female, black and hispanic workers who "are at greater risk of
falling into poverty if they lose their jobs." See Danielle Tarantolo, Note, From Em-
ployment to Contract: Section 1981 and Antidiscrimination Law for the Independent
Contractor Workforce, 116 YALE L.J. 170, 174 (2006) (citing BuREAu OF LABOR STA-
TsTIcs, U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, Contingent and Alternative Employment Arrangements,
4, 6 (2005), http://www.bls.gov/news.release/pdf.conemp.pdf; 51 STAN. L. REv. 73,
104 (1998); Anne E. Polivka, A Profile of Contingent Workers, MONTHLY LAB. REV.
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vidual level, the classification system itself values characteristics in an
inequitable manner, relegating some individuals to second-class status
and dehumanizing those individuals.
1. Group-Level Under-Inclusiveness
First, Title VII is under-inclusive because only individuals held to
be members of one of its protected categories' receive non-
discrimination protections. Although membership in Title VII's classes
may initially appear straightforward, that is not always the case." If Ti-
tle VII's purpose is to eradicate arbitrary discrimination in employment,
then its classes are immensely under-inclusive because all but a few select
subgroups '6 of employees are unprotected from discrimination by Title
VII (protecting employees only on the basis of "race, color, religion, sex,
or national origin ).6' As the Supreme Court stated, the "whole purpose
of Title VII was to deprive employers of their 'traditional business free-
dom' to discriminate.,""7 Despite Title VII, discrimination still occurs, in
droves, for a variety of reasons-as evidenced by the 68,710 charges of
(Oct. 1996), 10, 11, http://www.bls.gov/opub/mir/1996/10/art2full.pdf; Gillian
Lester, Careers and Contingency).
166. Courts often force a plaintiff who is a member of multiple Title VII protected classes
to choose only one theory of discrimination under which to proceed. See Bradley Al-
len Areheart, Intersectionality and Identity: Revisiting a Wrinkle in Title VII, 17 GEO.
MASON U. C.R. L.J. 199, 209-11 (2006). Among other effects, this negatively im-
pacts women of color. See Castro & Corral, supra note 43, at 160-61. As Castro and
Corral state:
Many theorists have grappled with the problem of women of color who
experience employment discrimination and intend to litigate a Tide VII
claim not because they are people of color or because they are women, but
because they are women of color. . . . [The theorists] criticize the system of
categorization in which the multidimensionality of people and their experi-
ences are lost in a categorical framework.
See Castro & Corral, supra note 43, at 160-61.
167. See Davison, supra note 159, at 164.
168. Although these categories initially seem all-encompassing, in reality, many employees
are left out in the cold and denied protections under Title VII (e.g. individuals are
unprotected from discrimination on innumerable bases not listed in Tide VII, such as
single parents, any members of political parties, gun owners, and others). Additional-
ly, even those who might appear to have protections are often denied them, such as
LGBT individuals who are excluded from Title VII's "because of sex" protections,
and individuals who are members of more than one group who are often forced to se-
lect a theory on which to sue on the basis of one group membership but not the
other, etc.
169. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 [Section 703] (1964).
170. United Steelworkers of Am. v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 246 (1979).
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discrimination under Title VII that the EEOC received in fiscal year
2009 alone."' Thus, Title VII's protections for only certain classes have
not achieved their broad purpose and do not make sense because, as one
scholar put it:
there is no rational basis to protect certain classes from arbi-
trary discrimination in areas such as employment and housing,
while withholding protection from those who are treated
equally irrationally but on the basis of classifications different
from those set forth in the statutes as unlawful." 2
Additionally, this group-level under-inclusiveness is responsible for
great administrative burdens and costs for Congress, as well as unaccept-
ably high costs for uncovered individuals (i.e. a lack of protection for
potentially years in the future, if they are ever granted categorical protec-
tion at all). The categorical approach requires Congress to amend Title
VII any time it seeks to redefine the types of individuals protected by
Title VII, or enact stand-alone legislation any time it desires to protect a
class of persons not currently protected under Title VII. Both actions are
inefficient and difficult to accomplish. Several examples illustrate this
point.
Since its passage, Title VII has been amended on several occasions by
Acts including: the Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, the
Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978, the Civil Rights Reformation Act
of 1987, the Civil Rights Act of 1991, and the Family and Medical Leave
Act of 1993.' 3 In order to pass each Act and each amendment to Title VII
redefining employment non-discrimination protections, a significant out-
lay of congressional resources has been required. Any attempt to add a
group to the list of protected classes in Title VII has "unleashed furious
debate.""' Hundreds of hours of congressional time have been spent de-
bating and implementing amendments to Title VII. This method of
legislating is inefficient and does not employ a forward-thinking ap-
proach (i.e. an approach that would anticipate and meet the needs of
currently unprotected groups of individuals suffering discrimination
171. See EQUAL EMP'T OPPORTUNITY COMM'N, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964
Charges (includes concurrent charges with ADEA, ADA and EPA) FY 1997-FY 2009,
http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/statistics/enforcement/titlevii.cfm.
172. See Bayer, supra note 13, at 56.
173. See Boyd Childress, Equal Opportunity, REFERENCE FOR Bus., http://www.
referenceforbusiness.comlencyclopedia/Ent-Fac/Equal-Opportunity.html.
174. Teaching with Documents: The Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission, THE NAT'L ARCHIVES, http://www.archives.gov/education/
lessons/civil-rights-act/.
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before the discrimination against such individuals is widespread and
more difficult to remediate).
Furthermore, when attempts to redefine extant categories of pro-
tected individuals under Title VII have failed, efforts have been made to
pass stand-alone legislation to protect those individuals. However, stand-
alone legislation usually takes years to pass, if the legislation ever actually
achieves passage.'7 ' The Disability Rights Movement preceded the suc-
cessful enactment of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 by
decades,"'7 just as the Gay Rights Movement preceded the first of many
unsuccessful attempts (in 1974) to pass the Employment Non-
Discrimination Act ("ENDA"), which would have granted employment
non-discrimination protections upon LGBT employees.'7 These are
merely a few examples of the ways in which congressional action to
broaden employment non-discrimination protections is often unsuccess-
ful, and when such efforts are successful, it can take decades-leaving
thousands of individuals without equal employment opportunities in
the meantime. Some academics contend that even if ENDA did pass, it
would be insufficient."'7 These scholars argue that only by amending Title
VII to be more inclusive can especially vulnerable groups, such as
transgender individuals, obtain adequate employment non-discrimination
protections. This is so because "federal courts have demonstrated a con-
tinued reluctance to afford protection to LGBT individuals, [so] they will
be less likely to read a free-standing piece of legislation as expansively as
[an amended] Tide VII."' 79 Thus, the categorical approach is intolerably
175. See, e.g., Jeannette Cox, "Corrective" Surgery and the Americans with Disabilities Act,
46 SAN DIEGo L. REv. 113, 118 (2009) ("In the decade following Title Vii's enact-
ment, civil rights advocates attempted to amend Title VII to add 'disability' to Title
VII's protected categories.... [Tlhey ultimately achieved their goal to prohibit em-
ployment discrimination based on disability three decades after Title VII's
passage ... ) (emphasis added) (citing H.R. 14033, 92d Cong. (1972) (discussing
an attempt in 1972 to add "physical or mental handicap" to the list of protected clas-
ses under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964); S. REP. No. 96-416, at 1 (1979)
(discussing a similar attempt in 1979)).
176. See Arlene Mayerson, The History of the ADA: A Movement Perspective, DISABILITY
RIGHTs EDUC. & DEF. FUND (1992), http://www.dredf.org/publications/ada
history.shtml.
177. See generally Anastasia Niedrich, No More Excuses: Making the Case for Equal Em-
ployment Law in Utah, A Comparative Analysis of Laws, Rhetoric and Arguments on
ENDA Legislation, 9 HINCKLEY J. POL. 7 (2008).
178. See Palmer, supra note 25, at 892 (citing Jasiunas, supra note 43, at 1556-57).
179. See Palmer, supra note 25, at 892 (citing Jasiunas, supra note 43, at 1557). Although
this Author once believed that passing ENDA would be the better, more desirable,
and efficacious means by which to achieve workplace equality for LGBT individuals,
the Author now believes that the EQA is the best means to achieve that end. See gen-
erally Niedrich, supra note 177, at 7.
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inefficient and is not forward-thinking, to the continuing detriment of
thousands of qualified employees, transgender and otherwise.
Title VII, as currently written, is impermissibly flawed and the cur-
rent language of the statute does not make it simple to improve or
change it. Legislative change is difficult to accomplish and wrought with
political obstacles, and it is also slow-going and riddled with loopholes,
no matter how well-intentioned or thorough Congress attempts to be. It
would be prudent to adopt a revised version of Title VII that does not
make change difficult (or necessary so often), especially considering the
nature of the ever-expanding LGBTQIA community and its definition
of "sex."' Further, it would be prudent to adopt an amended version of
Title VII that does not enable would-be discriminators to maneuver
through loopholes by enumerating discrete and incomprehensive catego-
ries of persons that courts then define as desired in order to exclude
protections.
2. Individual-Level Under-Inclusiveness
Second, Title VII classes are under-inclusive because even some in-
dividuals who are (by almost any definition) members of protected
classes are excluded from non-discrimination protections by court inter-
pretation. Notwithstanding the lack of congressional discussion, history
or intent regarding the late addition of the "because of sex provision,"'8 '
the text of the provision does not seem as clear-cut as the pre-Hopkins
courts would make it seem. Within Title VII, the phrases "because of
sex" and "on the basis of sex" are defined to "include, but are not limited
to, because of or on the basis of pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical
180. For example, transgender and intersex persons have existed since time immemorial,
but society did not gain consciousness of their existence until relatively recently. The
same can be said for gay, lesbian, and bisexual individuals. The existence of
transgender and intersex individuals only recently became known on a widespread ba-
sis within even the LGBT community, and such expansions in the community, and
recent additions thereto, support an inclusive, broad and adaptable Title VII to afford
these and other individuals employment protections. The language of Title VII will
be most efficient if it can adapt to changes in society and the workplace without con-
stant need for revision. Although the need for change may not seem to present itself
frequently, the LGBT community and the interracial community provide evidence to
the contrary-before the era of Loving v. Virginia, fifty or so years ago, many would
have thought it ridiculous to consider the need for employment protections from dis-
crimination "because of race" for interracial persons.
181. See Holloway v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 566 F.2d 659, 662 (9th Cit. 1977), overrul-
ing recognized by Schwenk v. Hartford, 204 F.3d 1187 (9th Cir. 2000).
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conditions."l82 It seems all too apparent that the phrase "but are not lim-
ited to" signifies that conditions aside from strict binary, biological
gender were envisioned falling under the umbrella of "sex" in Title VII.
Unfortunately, the majority of courts have latched on to the word "sex"
out of this context, ascribing a narrow binary definition to the term that
is also unsupported by the congressional record.' As a result of courts'
interpretations in this manner, transgender persons have found them-
selves all but sex-less and gender-less, excluded from Title VII's
protections and suffering the traumatic consequences of the exclusion,
despite having a distinct biological and psychological sex and gender
identity.'
Even individuals covered by Title VII's class-based framework often
find it difficult to bring or succeed with Title VII class action employ-
ment discrimination litigation.' In some Title VII class actions, courts
have narrowly defined classes in a manner detrimental to individual
plaintiffs.' Some such courts have narrowed the classes of persons alleg-
ing Title VII violations to the point where individual plaintiffs "find it
impossible to bring an individual suit or narrow class action even when
[they have] a meritorious claim" due to cost, practicality, proof prob-
lems, or other reasons. In instances in which classes are able to bring
Title VII class actions, like all class action proceedings, courts become
182. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1964) (emphasis added).
183. See, e.g., Schroer v. Billington, 424 F. Supp.2d 203 (D.D.C. 2006); Ulane v. E. Air-
lines, Inc., 742 F.2d 1081, 1085 (7th Cir. 1984); Holloway, 566 F.2d at 662. All of
these cases narrowly interpreted "sex" despite the lack of congressional record, discus-
sion, or stated intent one way or another.
184. See Amanda S. Eno, Notes & Comments, The Misconception of "Sex" in Title VII:
Federal Courts Reevaluate Transsexual Employment Discrimination Claims, 43 TULSA
L. REv. 765, 766-67 (2008) (discussing historical and societal binary gender norms
and implications for "transgender people who do not fit into one of the two tradi-
tional gender categories"); id at 767 (citing Dean Spade, Resisting Medicine,
Re/modeling Gender, 18 BERKELEY WOMEN'S L.J. 15, 25-26 (2003) (outlining how
the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual discusses symptoms of Gender Identity Disor-
der, including gender inappropriate behavior. The Author further states that the
results of excluding transgender individuals from traditional gender and sex defini-
tions or categories include transgender individuals being "regularly denied
employment, fired from jobs, denied housing and public accommodations ... har-
assed, [and] beaten or murdered because of hatred of their gender nonconformity"));
id. at 767 (citing Sean Cahill, Preface to Paisley Currah & Shannon Minter,
Transgender Equality: A Handbook for Activists and Policymakers i, iii (2000),
POL'Y INST. NATL. GAY & LESBIAN TASK FORCE, available at http://www.
thetaskforce.org/downloads/reports/reports/TransgenderEquality.pdf).
185. See generally Harvard Law Review, Note, Certifying Classes and Subclasses in Title VII
Suits, 99 HARv. L. REv. 619 (1986).
186. See generally id.
187. See id. at 626.
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bogged down by administrative and adjudicative difficulties concomi-
tant with the scale and unique demands of class actions.' For example,
recently the Ninth Circuit certified a class of female workers against
Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., alleging discrimination in employment condi-
tions and pay under Title VII's "because of sex" provision.'' It is
estimated that the class might "include more than 1.5 million wom-
en.""o The matter is the largest ever employment discrimination case to
date."' The case is so large that the defendant asserted "that the number
of litigants that the lawsuit purports to represent is too big to defend."" 2
For those who are fortunate enough to have coverage under Title VII,
the statute's categorical approach is problematic in that its categories
are oftentimes defined narrowly to exclude claimants with valid claims,
and at other times are so broadly defined that it results in little to no
relief for the respective individuals in the categorical class. Thus, the
categorical nature of Title VII as it is currently written is unacceptably
under-inclusive at the individual level, denying both covered and un-
covered aggrieved individuals the opportunity to bring and succeed on
meritorious claims.
3. Dehumanizing Categorization and Valuation
Third, Title VII's categorical approach is unsatisfactory because, at
the individual level, the classification system itself values characteristics
in an inequitable manner. Both textually and by interpretation, it rele-
gates some individuals to second-class status, dehumanizing those
individuals in several ways. One of the ways that Title VII's categorical
approach dehumanizes individuals is by omitting broad segments of the
general population from its protections, many of whom are "similarly
situated" to those covered under Title VII'" (e.g. a transgender male-to-
female person who by nearly all objective measures, is just as much a
woman as a "biological"-born woman) and "similar to them in terms of
188. See, e.g., Earle K. Shawe, Processing the Explosion in Title VII Class Action Suits:
Achieving Increased Compliance with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(a), 19 WM. &
MARY L. REv. 469 (1978) (generally discussing the "explosion" in the amount, size
and demands of Tide VII class action litigation).
189. Ashby Jones, Huge Class Action To Go Forward Against Wal-Mart, THE WALL STREET
JouRNAL LAW BLOG (Apr. 26, 2010, 3:44 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/lawl2010/04/
26/ninth-circuit-rules-huge-class-action-can-go-forward-against-wal-mart/.
190. Id.
191. Dan Levine, 9th Circuit OKs Huge Wal-Mart Class, LAW.COM (Apr. 27, 2010),
http://www.law.com/jsp/article.jsp?id=1202453241382.
192. Jones, supra note 189.
193. See Bayer, supra note 13, at 56.
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the purpose of the law."" 4 As at least one prominent constitutional
scholar has recognized, "classifications degrade the worth of individuals
and ultimately intensify social stigma.""' Whether one considers gender
or gender identity elected or immutable, other characteristics-both the
immutable, such as race, and the elected, such as religion-that are
equally as central to an individual's identity as their gender, are protected
under Title VII. It is irrational to afford employment opportunities and
non-discrimination protections to some qualified individuals with cer-
tain person-centric traits and deny the same to others with highly
similar, meaningful, and analogous traits. Title VII's classifications are
neither integral nor sufficient to achieve the purposes of the statute, and
they serve to degrade those who are not afforded the benefits of Title
VII protection-transgender individuals chiefly among them."' Even
where Title VII does grant employment non-discrimination protections,
the statute does so inexplicably inconsistently. Title VII claims to pro-
hibit discrimination according to the nature of the discrimination (e.g.
discrimination based on race), but in reality, Title VII's categorical sys-
tem permits or prohibits discrimination based on certain select
personal characteristics. The same discrimination based on the same
stereotypes or motivations is protected or unprotected based on the
type of person-for example, the same exact sex stereotyping and har-
assing actions taken against a biological female would be prohibited,
while the actions would be permitted against a transgender female.
Thus, one of the ways in which Title VII's categorical framework dehu-
manizes individuals is to exclude them from protections and relegate
them to second-class status for arbitrary reasons, protecting the same
acts of discrimination taken against others solely because they possess
different characteristics.19 7
Title VII's categorical structure serves to dehumanize transgender
persons specifically in several ways. One of the ways in which Title VII's
"rigid categories of normal sex and sexuality bullies [and degrades]
transgender people" is by forcing transgender persons "into articulating
194. See Bayer, supra note 13, at 56. (citing Rotunda, Nowak and Young, 2 CONsTrru-
TIONAL LAW: SUBSTANCE AND PROCEDURE, § 18.2 at 320 (1986)).
195. See Scott Grinsell, "The Prejudice of Caste' The Misreading oflustice Harlan and the
Ascendency ofAnticassification, 15 MICH. J. RACE & L. 317, 318 (2009-2010) (citing
Reva B. Siegel, Equality Talk: Antisubordination and Antic/assfi cation Values in Con-
stitutional Struggles over Brown, 117 HARv. L. REv. 1470, 1472-73 (2004)).
196. See Bayer, supra note 13, at 56.
197. See Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 633, 642 (1996) (discussing the way in which
members of the LGBT community suffer unconstitutional discrimination based on
certain characteristics unlike any other groups).
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their identities in a way that conflicts with their sense of self."'" Moreo-
ver, the courts interpretations of and definitions of the contours of Tide
VII's categories to exclude transgender persons dehumanizes them by
making unconventional gender expression or identity "synonymous with
willful deceit"' or by utilizing the language of monstrosity to describe
transgender persons and their bodies.200 Title Viis categorical structure
leaves wide latitude for courts to use offensive language to relay why cer-
tain individuals do not fit into an enumerated category. This categorical
framework also sanctions discriminatory employers' and courts' preju-
dices against transgender individuals by ratifying adverse employment
decisions made solely on the basis of an individual's transgender status.
These are just some of the many ways in which Title VII's categories
intolerably serve to deprive transgender persons of their humanity.
With the passage of Title VII in 1964, and with subsequent
amendments, Congress made policy decisions and performed valuations
that ratified discrimination against some in an attempt to eradicate dis-
crimination against others. 20' Title Vii's categorical scheme values some
individuals above others by certifying those protected individuals' dis-
crimination claims as more deserving than others. At the same time, this
categorical scheme also allows employers to elevate certain aspects of a
198. See Abigail W. Lloyd, Defining the Human: Are Transgendered People Strangers to the
Law?, 20 BERKELEY J. GENDER L. & JUST. 150 (2005). Lloyd explains:
[T]he law recognizes two sexes ... and provides protection based on sex in
a limited way.... [To] get standing under the laws that protect against sex
discrimination, a transgender person would need to articulate his or her ...
"sex" in a way that falls under recognized legal categories [and in a way that
may not align with the transgender person's sex or sense of self as they
identify it]. This does a kind of violence to transgender people.
Id. at 157.
199. See Lloyd, supra note 198, at 169.
200. See Lloyd, supra note 198, at 162-63 (discussing the language used by the Seventh
Circuit in the Ulane case, including: "Ulane is entitled to any personal belief about
her sexual identity she desires. After the surgery, hormones, appearance changes ... it
may be that society . . . considers Ulane to be female. But even if one believes that a
woman can be so easily created from what remains of a man, that does not decide this
case") (citing Ulane, 742 F.2d at 1087 (footnote omitted)).
201. See Mark R. Bandsuch, The NBA Dress Code and Other Fashion Faux Pas Under Title
VII, 16 VILL. SPoRTs & ENT. L.J. 1, 28-29 (2009) (discussing the way in which some
scholars and courts have evaluated the relative abhorrence of historical discrimination
against certain groups, valuing and assigning federal employment anti-discrimination
protections to them in a sort of ranking system, with "the protections afforded each
[category of persons] respectively in descending order . . . (1) race or national origin;
(2) sex; (3) age; (4) religion; and, (5) disability") (citing William R. Corbett, The Ugly
Truth About Appearance Discrimination and the Beauty of Our Employment Discrimi-
nation Law, 14 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL'Y 153, 168 (2007)).
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person above their qualifications, making employment decisions (posi-
tive or adverse) based on personal characteristics rather than ability. It
could be inferred that Congress considers discrimination against a per-
son because of their religion more repugnant than discrimination
against a person because of their gender expression, political affiliation,
marital status, appearance, military service record, or other unlisted
characteristics, and Congress considers certain characteristics more or
less important than qualifications or merit.202 Unfortunately, as a re-
sult, individuals are put into classes; those who are afforded anti-
discrimination protections based on arbitrary values are safeguarded
while all others are dehumanized, subjected to pervasive employment
discrimination, and prevented from providing for themselves or better-
ing their circumstances through gainful employment. Therefore,
Congress's categorical approach is intolerably dehumanizing because it
amounts to a ratification of discrimination against individuals who are
not deemed members of protected classes, placing a lower value on their
suffering from discrimination because of who they are as a person.
D. Categories as Swords and Shields
Yet another issue with the class-dependent nature of Title VII is
that the categories are often used as swords and shields2 0 3 in whichever
manner is convenient for an employer or necessary for a court to obtain
a desired result-at the detriment to transgender and other employees.204
202. Congress initially selected certain groups for employment non-discrimination pro-
tections on the basis of historical suffering, discrimination, and disadvantage. The
validity of those groups' experiences is not in dispute. See Mass. Bd. of Ret. v.
Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 313 (1976) (noting Title VII protected classes' subjection
to "a history of purposeful unequal treatment" and relegation to a "position of
political powerlessness" warranting protections). If the basis for justifying group
protections of this sort is historical suffering, discrimination, and disadvantage,
then the LGBT community's history and experience as a group also justifies em-
ployment non-discrimination protections. See Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 704 F.
Supp. 2d 921 (N.D. Cal. 2010) (discussing numerous experts' findings of histori-
cally widespread, hateful, and horrific discrimination and prejudice against
members of the LGBT community).
203. Supreme Court Justice Stevens discussed this concept in Johnson v. Transp. Agency of
Santa Clara County, 480 U.S. 616, 642 (1987) (Stevens, J., concurring).
204. See Jill D. Weinberg, Gender Nonconformity: An Analysis of Perceived Sexual Orienta-
tion and Gender Identity Protection Under the Employment Non-Discrimination Act, 44
U.S.F. L. REv. 1, 1 (2009) (asserting that a close examination of Title VII cases in-
volving allegations of employment discrimination against transgender persons
"because of sex" supports that "courts were acting purposively by applying different
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As some scholars and transgender rights activists have recognized, it is a
fact that "[no matter how a transgender plaintiff articulates his injury,
he is likely to encounter a court that draws a line in a way that makes
him a stranger to all of the laws that could have protected him."205 Since
the first instance a transgender person brought suit for sex discrimina-
tion under Title VII thirty-five years ago,206 courts and bigoted
employers have cited the same few arguments for denying transgender
individuals protections from employment discrimination. 207 The argu-
ments against transgender employment protection from discrimination
"because of sex" take three basic forms: (1) that a lack of congressional
discussion, instruction, or stated intent as to the scope and meaning of
"sex" requires a narrow interpretation of "sex" that excludes transgender
persons; (2) transgender status does not implicate sex stereotype con-
cerns or discrimination; and (3) transgender sex reassignment does not
involve true sex, but merely a change of sex. The use of these arguments
as swords and shields is explained further below.
Employers seeking to justify discrimination against transgender in-
dividuals have long invoked, and courts have long hidden behind, the
argument that a lack of congressional guidance or action on the scope
and meaning of "sex" in Title VII requires a narrow interpretation that
excludes protections on the basis of gender identity (or sexual orienta-
tion). The case of Holloway v. Arthur Andersen & Co.208 represents one
such instance. In Holloway, the aggrieved plaintiffs employer terminat-
ed her for undergoing a gender transition at work.209 Holloway filed suit
for transsexual discrimination "because of sex" under Tide VII and lost.210
The Ninth Circuit in Holloway relied on several considerations, all flow-
ing from the lack of congressional guidance on the definition and scope of
"sex" in Title VII, in upholding the discrimination by Holloway's employ-
categories for certain types of cases and individuals as a way to prohibit recovery for
plaintiffs of a particular sexual orientation or gender identity.").
205. See Lloyd, supra note 198, at 154.
206. See Grossman v. Bernards Tp. Bd. of Educ., 1975 WL 302 (D.N.J. Sept. 10, 1975)
(holding that transgender teacher's termination was proper because: sex reassignment
did not implicate true sex, transgender status does not implicate sex stereotypes, and
lack of congressional guidance requires narrow interpretation in accordance with
"plain meaning" of "sex," which does not include transgender persons).
207. See Jillian Todd Weiss, Transgender Identity, Textualism, and the Supreme Court:
What is the "Plain Meaning" of "Sex" in Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964?, 18
TEMP. POL. & CIv. Rrs. L. REV. 573, 616-38 (2009) (providing detailed discussion
of employers' and courts' reasoning against transgender employment protections cases
over time).
208. Holloway v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 566 F.2d 659 (9th Cir. 1977).
209. Holloway, 566 F.2d at 662.
210. Holloway, 566 F.2d at 661.
[Vol. 18:2566
THE EMPLOYMENT QUALIFICATIONS APPROACH
er. The factors included the "dearth of legislative history" on the "be-
cause of sex" provision, 2 1  an assumption "that Congress had only the
traditional notions of 'sex' in mind" (i.e. biological sex) regarding the
provision, and a lack of legislative activity on the issue2 12 as evidence that
"Congress has not shown any intent other than to restrict the term
'sex' to its traditional meaning." 213 Despite the seemingly open-ended
definition of "sex" in Title VII, 214 and numerous precedents from the
United States Supreme Court and circuit courts counseling for a broad
interpretation of the remedial statute,215 the Holloway court still
employed a narrow approach to the provision to exclude transgender
persons from the scope of Title VII's sex protections. The Holloway
court, like so many other courts, was notified of a claim, decided that
Title VII would be the applicable statute, and in interpreting the stat-
ute, narrowly construed all of the words in the remedial statute so as to
deny protection, asserting a lack of congressional guidance as the reason.
In these aforementioned ways, the congressional guidance/action argu-
ment has been used as a sword by employers and a shield by courts to
deny transgender employees protections from discrimination "because
of sex" under Title VII.
Employers have also argued that taking adverse employment action
because of transgender status does not impermissibly involve sex
211. Holloway, 566 F.2d at 662.
212. As referred to here, the "lack of legislative activity" means Congress's failure to add a
category of protections to Title VII, failure to redefine "sex" under Title VII, and
failure to pass the Employment Non-Discrimination Act, to grant protections to
transgender persons or others in the LGBT community.
213. Holloway, 566 F.2d at 663.
214. The very text of Title V11's "because of sex" provision, and the way in which it is
defined in the statute, support a broader interpretation of "sex" than merely biologi-
cal sex. The statute specifies that pregnancy and "related medical conditions" are also
included in the definition of "because of sex," among other things. See 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e(k) (1964) (defining "because of sex" and "on the basis of sex"). There is no
evidence one way or another suggesting that Congress did or did not intend
transgender individuals to be covered under Title VII's sex protections. However, the
language covering "related medical conditions" suggests that although Congress
might not have been thinking primarily of transgender discrimination when it enact-
ed Title VII, it might not have intended to exclude protections for transgender
individuals either.
215. Several cases decided prior to Holloway on the subject of Title VII's purpose and its
correct interpretation counsel for a broader interpretation than the Holloway court
gave the "because of sex" provision. See, e.g., Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415
U.S. 36, 44-45 (1974) (holding that in order to effectuate its purpose of eradicating
the evils of employment discrimination, Title VII should be given a liberal construc-
tion); Baker v. Stuart Broad. Co., 560 F.2d 389, 391 (8th Cir. 1977) (same); Sibley
Mem'l Hosp. v. Wilson, 488 F.2d 1338, 1340-42 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (same); Tipler v.
E.I. duPont de Nemours and Co., 443 F.2d 125, 131 (6th Cir. 1971) (same).
2011] 67
MICHIGAN JOURNAL OF GENDER & LAW
stereotypes in violation of Title VII's "because of sex" provision, and
courts have agreed. Although one post-Hopkins circuit court used this
reasoning to hold that Title VII's "because of sex" provision did protect
transgender individuals from sex stereotyping discrimination in
employment,216 the vast majority of courts considering the question have
cited this argument for the contrary proposition. For example, in the
case of Oiler v. Winn-Dixie Louisiana,217 another post-Hopkins federal
court decision applied the same argument and precedents to reach a
contrary result. In Oiler, the plaintiff was a truck driver who was fired
after mentioning to his superior that he occasionally dressed as a woman
at home.218 Oiler was terminated due to his transvestite status, even
though he never expressed a transgender or female gender identity in the
workplace.219 Oiler sued under Title VII, alleging sex stereotyping
discrimination under the "because of sex" provision and the Hopkins
precedent. 220 The federal district court affirmed summary judgment for
the employer, arguing that the Ulane precedent was still usable after
Hopkins,221' distinguishing between "an employee of one sex exhibiting
characteristics associated with the opposite sex" (Hopkins) and
"pretending" to be the other sex (Oiler).222 The Oiler court held that
"Title VII's prohibition of discrimination on the basis of sex includes
sexual stereotypes, [but] the phrase 'sex' has not been interpreted to
include sexual identity or gender identity disorders." 223 Hence, the sex
stereotyping argument has been used as another type of sword by
employers, and a shield by courts, to deny transgender employees
protections from sex stereotyping discrimination under Title VII.
The last way in which employers and courts have used categories to
achieve a desired result-exclusion of transgender individuals from Title
216. See Smith v. City of Salem, 378 F.3d 566, 571-72 (6th Cir. 2004).
217. Oiler v. Winn-Dixie La., Inc., 2002 WL 31098541 (E.D. La. Sept. 16, 2002).
218. Oiler, 2002 WL 31098541, at *1.
219. Oiler, 2002 WL 31098541, at *2.
220. Oiler, 2002 WL 31098541, at *1.
221. See Oiler, 2002 WL 31098541, at *6 (claiming that the Ulane precedent is viable
even after Hopkins, as "sex" in Title VII and sex stereotyping in Hopkins refer only to
biological sex).
222. See Oiler, 2002 WL 31098541, at *6. The Oiler court put it thusly:
Plaintiffs actions are not akin to the behavior . .. in Price Waterhouse. The
plaintiff in that case may not have behaved as the partners thought a wom-
an should have, but she never pretended to be a man.. . . This is not just a
matter of an employee of one sex exhibiting characteristics associated with
the opposite sex. This is a matter of a person of one sex assuming the role
of a person of the opposite sex.
Oiler, 2002 WL 31098541, at *6.
223. See Oiler, 2002 WL 31098541, at *6.
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VII's protections - is by finding that transgender sex reassignment does
not involve sex itself, but is merely a process of change. The Holloway
and Ulane cases provide two examples. In Holloway v. Arthur Andersen &
Co.,22 the Ninth Circuit held that a "transsexual individual's decision to
undergo sex change surgery does not bring that individual, nor trans-
sexuals as a class, within the scope of Title VII."225 Without much
discussion of its reasoning, the court defined the issue in such a way as
to deny protections to the transgender plaintiff:
Title VII remedies are equally available to all individuals for
employment discrimination based on race, religion, sex, or na-
tional origin. Indeed, consistent with the determination of this
court, transsexuals claiming discrimination because of their sex,
male or female, would clearly state a cause of action under Title
VII. Holloway has not claimed to have been treated discrimina-
torily because she is male or female, but rather because she is a
transsexual who chose to change her sex. This type of claim is
not actionable under Title VII and is certainly not in violation
of the doctrines of Due Process and Equal Protection.226
Additionally, in Ulane v. E Airlines,2 27 the Seventh Circuit held that
discrimination against transsexual employees does not constitute dis-
crimination "because of sex" under Title VII,228 in part because the court
found that the sex reassignment process does not completely transform
an individual from a male to a female. 229 The Seventh Circuit took note
of, in its view, the incomplete nature of gender transitioning.23 0 The
court commented:
Ulane began taking female hormones as part of her treatment,
and eventually developed breasts from the hormones. In 1980,
she underwent 'sex reassignment surgery.' After the surgery,
Illinois issued a revised birth certificate indicating Ulane was
female, and the FAA certified her for flight status as a female.
Ulane's own physician explained, however, that the operation
would not create a biological female in the sense that Ulane
224. Holloway v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 566 F.2d 659 (9th Cir. 1977).
225. Holloway, 566 F.2d at 664.
226. Holloway, 559 F.2d at 664.
227. Ulane v. E. Airlines, 742 F.2d 1081 (7th Cir. 1984).
228. See U/ane, 742 F.2d at 1084.
229. See U/ane, 742 F.2d at 1083, nn.3-6 (remarking on the incomplete nature of gender
transitioning that transsexuals undergo (i.e. inability to alter genetic makeup or fertil-
ity)).
230. Ulane, 742 F.2d at 1083, nn.3-6.
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would 'have a uterus and ovaries and be able to bear babies.'
Ulane's chromosomes, all concede, are unaffected by the hor-
mones and surgery. Ulane, however, claims that the lack of
change in her chromosomes is irrelevant.231
In both of these cases, the courts narrowly identified the issues and
focused on one aspect of the transgender individual's experience to in-
terpret Title VII in a manner that excluded transgender persons from
Title VII's "because of sex" protections. The malevolent intent of such
actions by employers and "unbiased" courts becomes apparent when one
considers that a change of religion (another category protected under
Title VII) would still render an individual protected under Title VII,232
and yet with a change of sex, courts and employers perform analytical
gymnastics to avoid that result.
Further, it is disingenuous to narrow sex-based protections to this
level, because chromosomes or the possession of ovaries is not otherwise
taken into account in sex discrimination cases involving non-
transgender plaintiffs. Unlike Karen Ulane's claim,233 the validity of Ann
Hopkins's "because of sex" discrimination claim was not disputed be-
cause of her chromosomes, ovaries, or other female-identifying
biological characteristics, which were never even considered. Thus, as
did the Holloway and Ulane courts, employers and courts frequently use
different facets of individuals' experiences and identities as swords and
shields, defining processes and statuses as necessary to deny transgender
individuals protection from employment discrimination "because of sex"
under Title VII.
231. U/ane, 742 F.2d at 1083.
232. See, e.g., Blalock v. Metals Trades, Inc., 775 F.2d 703 (6th Cir. 1985). In Blalock, an
employee met a future associate in a prayer group and was hired, but after changing
his religious views, was terminated. Id. at 704-05. In reversing and remanding the
lower court's finding for employer, the Sixth Circuit stated:
Blalock's change in his religious views was at least a factor in the dis-
charge. ... When an employer expresses an enhanced tolerance of an
employee's performance because of his religion, but lowers its level of tol-
erance when the employee's previously agreeable religious views change,
the employer has engaged in intentional differential treatment based on re-
ligion.
Blalock, 775 F.2d 703 at 709.
233. See Uane, 742 F.2d at 1083.
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E. The Costs of Categorization
Title VII's prohibitions against category-based employment dis-
crimination costs employers a great deal of money. Employers incur
costs for both Title VII compliance and non-compliance. Since the Ex-
ecutive Order 11246 of September 24, 1965,234 employers and
contractors who do over $10,000 in annual business with the federal
government have been prohibited "from discriminating in employment
decisions on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. 2 11
Further, Executive Order 11246 requires such entities "to take affirma-
tive action to ensure that equal opportunity is provided in all aspects of
their employment, 236 including a requirement to develop a written af-
firmative action program for such employers with 50 or more employees
and $50,000 or more in government contracts. Private employers are
also currently prohibited from discriminating on the basis of an individ-
ual's membership in any class enumerated in Title VII. When an em-
employer violates Title VII, the employer is sometimes subject to costly
monetary penalties of thousands of dollars or, on rare occasion, of
millions or hundreds of millions of dollars.237
Above and beyond the cost of Title VII non-compliance, employers
incur costs in attempts to achieve Tide VII compliance. In the aggregate,
employers spend enormous amounts of capital to ensure that staff mem-
bers are trained on non-discrimination laws and policies, and to design
and operate programs to ensure workplace diversity and other costly
measures. 238 Furthermore, it is a common perception, and sometimes
234. Exec. Order No. 11246, 30 Fed. Reg. 12319 (Sept. 24, 1965), available at http://
www.dol.goviofccp/regs/statutes/eo 11246.htm.
235. Exec. Order No. 11246, as amended, 30 Fed. Reg. 12319 (Sept. 24, 1965), available
at http://www.dol.gov/ofccp/regs/statutes/eol l246.htm.
236. Id.
237. See, e.g., Record $250 Million Punitive Damages Award Entered in Gender Discrimina-




cussing 250 million dollars in punitive damages and 3.3 million dollars in
compensatory damages awarded to class of approximately 5,600 women alleging
discrimination "because of sex").
238. Ricci v. DeStefano, 129 S. Ct. 2658 (2009) illustrates all too clearly how under the
current formulation of Title VII, employers must walk a fine line-an employer can-
not violate the statute by intentionally discriminating against a member of a
protected class, but an employer also cannot impermissibly confer benefits upon
some members of a protected class and not others unless the employer meets certain
requirements. Despite the City of New Haven's attempt to develop a fair and Title
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true, that employers sustain immeasurable costs when "made to hire or
promote,239 a "less qualified" 24 0 candidate because of the candidate's
membership in a certain protected class. Affirmative action programs
require employers to take into account an individual's membership in a
protected category and achieve a certain outcome in regard to diversity
proportions. Sometimes this requires an employer to bypass hiring or
promoting the most qualified candidate in order to achieve these catego-
ry-dictated ends.24 ' While these costs are only incurred sometimes by
some employers, these costs can be high and are entirely attributable to
Title VII's categorical structure and related requirements (e.g. affirma-
242
tive action programs). These costs may be justified on principle, but
the costs are incurred nonetheless. Thus, Title VII's categorical approach
can result in costly expenditures of money and other resources to em-
ployers that would not otherwise have those expenses but for the regime.
To sum up Part II, some of the insuperable and unacceptable flaws of
Title VII's categorical approach include: the regime causes resentment
toward protected class groups; the approach is categorically under-
inclusive at the group and individual levels; the categorical structure itself
places a value on, and therefore dehumanizes, individuals; the categories
are used as swords and shields in order to grant protections as discrimina-
tory employers and biased courts see fit; and Title VII's categorical
VII-compliant promotional examination for its firefighters, at an estimated expense
of over $100,000, City officials failed to successfully walk this line and the Supreme
Court held against them.
239. Employers are usually not forced or "made" to make any certain employment deci-
sion. The phrase "made to hire or promote" as it is used here connotes the social,
governmental, or other pressures that some employers may experience in making an
employment decision, where the pressure is usually to make a decision benefiting an
individual who is a member of a discrete minority group or Title VIl protected class.
240. See Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 545 (1980) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (noting
that such programs and class-based legislation are "perceived by many as resting on
an assumption that those who are granted this special preference are less qualified in
some respect that is identified purely by their [membership in a class group]").
241. See, e.g., Johnson v. Transp. Agency, Santa Clara Cnty., Ca., 480 U.S. 616, 625
(1987) ("The District Court found that Johnson [the non-minority group member
applicant] was more qualified for the dispatcher position than Joyce, and that the sex
of Joyce was the 'determining factor in her selection.' . . . The court acknowledge that
... the Agency justified its decision on the basis of its Affirmative Action plan.")
(emphasis in original). Both candidates were found qualified for the job in question.
Id. at 623. Despite that, the ohnson case still provides one example of an instance in
which an individual's membership in a protected class resulted in a different em-
ployment decision justified in order to achieve class-based ends. See id.
242. See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 247 (1995) (Stevens & Gins-
burg, JJ., dissenting) ("As a matter of constitutional and democratic principle, a
decision ... [may be made] to impose incidental costs on the majority of their con-
stituents in order to provide a benefit to a disadvantaged minority.").
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structure can, and often does, result in massive costs to employers of
money and other resources.
IV. REMOVING CATEGORICAL CONSTRAINTS TO ACHIEVE SUCCESS:
THE EMPLOYMENT QUALIFICATIONS APPROACH
As explicated, Title VII's categorical approach is problematic for
numerous reasons. Among those reasons, Title VII's enumerated catego-
ries of protected persons are ill-fitting because the categories grant
protections against discrimination in the workplace based on member-
ship in classes that bear no rational relation to an individual's ability to
do a job.243 The categories are also under-inclusive in that Title VII's pro-
tections grant employment non-discrimination protections to some and
deny them to others even though workplace discrimination affects indi-
viduals who would "fit into" more than just those enumerated classes.244
The categories are also vexed by some parties' maligned attempts to
243. This conclusion is rooted in common sense, practical experience, and academic theo-
ry. See, e.g., Evan H. Pontz, Comment, What a Difference ADEA Makes: Why
Disparate Impact Theory Should Not Apply to the Age Discrimination in Employment
Act, 74 N.C. L. REv. 267, 306 (1995) ("Title VII's protected classes and ability are
unrelated.").
244. Title VII protections are normally conferred on an individual based on their mem-
bership in a denominated protected class. However, some employers and courts make
adverse employment decisions based on an individual's non-membership in a Title
VII protected class, thus the "transferred intent" denomination. Such adverse em-
ployment decisions negatively affect not only transgender employees, but also many
others. See Kerri Lynn Stone, Ricci Glitch? The Unexpected Appearance of Transferred
Intent in Title VII, 55 Loy. L. REv. 751 (2009). Title VII categories are also under-
inclusive in that even when an individual is a member of two protected classes, courts
disaggregate their compound discrimination claims and force the plaintiff to choose
which theory of discrimination on which to proceed. See Bradley Allan Areheart, In-
tersectionality and Identity: Revisiting a Wrinkle in Title VII, 17 GEo. MASON U. C.R.
L.J. 199, 209-11 (2006); Castro & Corral, supra note 43, at 160-61. There is some
dispute over whether Congress intended Title VII to apply to compound cases in-
volving employment discrimination against an individual who is a member of more
than one category. Some interpret the "or" in "based on race, color, religion, sex or
national origin" (emphasis added) to mean that only claims involving one category
may be brought, while others interpret the phrase to mean that claims involving the
enumerated classes or even possibly unlisted classes (e.g. transgender persons) may be
brought under Title VII. See Virginia W. Wei, Note, Asian Women and Employment
Discrimination: Using Intersectionality Theory to Address Title VII Claims Based on
Combined Factors ofRace, Gender and National Origin, 37 B.C. L. REv. 771, 775-76
(1996) (citing Cathy Scarborough, Note, Conceptualizing Black Women's Employment
Experiences, 98 YALE L.J. 1457, 1466-67 (1989) (citing James C. Oldham, Questions
ofExclusion and Exception Under Title VII-"Sex-Plus" and the BFOQ, 23 HASTINGS
L.J. 55, 61 (1971))).
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shape and define the classifications in an attempt to achieve discrimina-
245
tory ends. Moreover, at the individual level, the classification system
itself values characteristics in an inequitable manner, relegating some
individuals to second-class status in a way that tends to dehumanize
246
them. In order to better achieve the goals of Title VII, restructuring is
necessary. This Part proposes and discusses one method to achieve these
ends-the "Employment Qualifications Approach" ("EQA"). The EQA
seeks to reframe the existing debate and restructure Title VII by chang-
ing the debate from one focusing on class membership, to one zeroed in
on an individual's true, objectively-discernible qualifications for em-
ployment. This Author's hope is that the EQA would remove barriers to
equal employment protections and result in a better-qualified, more fair-
ly treated and more effective workforce, benefiting employers and
employees alike.
A. A New Idea: The Employment Qualifcations Approach
The Employment Qualifications Approach proposes to analyze
employment decisions by focusing on an employee's qualifications for a
position while deemphasizing the inquiry into the employer's subjective
(often discriminatory) intent, in a category-less framework. The EQA
would alter the language of several provisions of Title VII, as well as the
burdens of proof to establish a Title VII violation in disparate impact,
disparate treatment, and mixed motives cases. The EQA seeks to ensure
that Title VII is interpreted and enforced in a manner that is in line with
the statute's broad remedial goals, and also takes into account changes in
the forms and targets of employment discrimination over time.
In order to implement the EQA, amendments to the language of
Title VII will be necessary. I propose to amend Title VII as follows
(changes in italics):
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-DEFINITIONS
"For the purposes of this subchapter-
[deleting provisions () and (k) defining "religion" and "because of
sex, " respectively]
245. See supra Part II.
246. See Bayer, supra note 13, at 56.
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(o) The term "employment" means any activity, business, or indus-
try affecting commerce taking place in whole or part within a
"State" of the United States ofAmerica as the term "State" is de-
fined in 42 US. C § 2000e(i).
(p) The term "qualifications," except as that term is used in
42 US. C 0 2000e(f) and 2000e-4 (a) to refer to voters or Gen-
eral Counsel of the EEOC, means legally elgible, competent or
able to perform an employment position, purpose, job, occupation,
or task that an individual holds or seeks, taking into account le-
gitimate considerations of training, education, experience,
competence, skill, professionalism, or other requirements for the
employment.
(1) An employee is "qualified" to obtain or hold employment if the
employee has the "qualfications"for the employment, as "qualfi-
cations" is defined herein.
(2) An employee is the "most qualified" to obtain or hold employ-
ment if the employee has objectively superior "qualifications" for
the employment as "qualfications" is defined herein, as deter-
mined by a "reasonable person" as "reasonable person" is
traditionally defined by the tort law of a "State" defined in 42
US. C § 2000e(i).
(3) Persons with disabilities as defined in the Americans with
Disabilities Act of 1990 ("ADA'9, 42 US.C §§ 12101-12213
(2000), should not be deemed un- "qualfied" or not the "most
qualified" or deemed failing to meet the "qualfications" necessary
for employment because of their disability status if such a person
would be deemed to meet the "qualifications" necessary for em-
ployment, and able to perform the "essential functions" of the
employment with "reasonable accommodation', as the terms "es-
sentialfrnctions" and "reasonable accommodation" are defined in
the ADA. 247
247. The ADA currently contains provisions that, left unchanged, might undermine the text,
scope and purpose of the EQA. Currently, the ADA excludes from coverage "gender
identity disorders not resulting from physical impairments." See Jennifer Levi, Protec-
tionsfrr Transgender Employees, Am. BAR Ass'N SECTION OF INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS AND
RESPONSIBILITIEs, http://www.abanet.org/irr/hr/summer03/protections.html. As a re-
sult, "most transgender people may not bring claims of disability discrimination
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Elsewhere in Title VII, all references to "race, color, religion, sex or
national origin" shall be replaced with "any ground, factor, reason, ra-
tionale, pretext, motive, or justification, other than the employee's qualifica-
qualifications"to read, for example, as follows:
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2-UNLAWFUL EMPLOYMENT
PRACTICES
(a) Employer practices. It shall be unlawful employment prac-
tice for an employer-
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or discharge any individual, or oth-
erwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to-
his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employ-
ment because of any ground, factor, reason, rationale, pretext,
motive, or justification other than the employee's qualifications; or
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applications
for employment in any way that would deprive or tend to de-
prive any individual of employment opportunities or
otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee because of
any ground, factor, reason, rationale, pretext, motive, or justifica-
tion other than the employee's qualifications.
Still elsewhere in Title VII, word phrasing and tense would be al-
tered to ensure grammatical correctness and to give effect to the
substance of these changes, without otherwise substantively altering the
text or meaning of Title VII.
Within this definition and the statute as changed under the EQA,
the specific employment qualifications for a position must be defined in
order for a court to determine whether an employer considered only an
individual's "qualifications" for employment and selected the "most
qualified" individual available. This inquiry should be easily manageable
for courts of the EEOC, as most employers post the qualifications nec-
essary for a position, or the qualifications an applicant must possess to
perform the job well. In any event, courts and the EEOC make similar
determinations under the current categorical regime, and should be just
as able to make such determinations under the EQA.
under federal antidiscrimination laws." See id. In order to ensure consistency across
federal law, it is assumed that the EQA would also amend the ADA and any similar
provisions in other federal laws that might conflict with the EQA.
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B. EQA Changes to Burdens ofProofand
Standards-Disparate Impact
Along with these changes to the text of Title VII itself, under the
EQA, corresponding changes would need to be made to the burdens of
proof and standards for establishing a Title VII violation for disparate
impact, disparate treatment, and mixed motives cases. Each will be con-
sidered in turn, beginning with disparate impact violations of Title VII.
I propose to amend the disparate impact burden of proof standard as
follows:
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2-UNLAWFUL EMPLOYMENT
PRACTICES
(a) Employer practices. It shall be unlawful employment
practice for an employer-
(k) Burden of proof in disparate impact cases
(1)(A) An unlawful employment practice based on disparate
impact is
established under this subchapter only if-
(i) a complaining parry demonstrates that a respondent uses a
particular employment practice that causes a disparate impact
on the basis of any ground, factor, reason, rationale, pretext, mo-
tive, or justfication, other than the employee's qualications; ...
One of the first instances in which the U.S. Supreme Court interpreted
the disparate impact violation was in the matter of Griggs v. Duke Power
Co. 2
48
Griggs held that employment practices must have a "manifest rela-
tionship to the employment in question. 249 Employment practices must
be related to job performance or a "business necessity," or else "the prac-
tice is prohibited."250 An employer can raise a defense to disparate impact
liability by demonstrating that an employment practice is "consistent with
248. See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
249. See Griggs, 401 U.S. at 432.
250. See Griggs, 401 U.S. at 431.
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business necessity," but the plaintiff may still succeed by demonstrat-
ing2 11 that the employer has failed to adopt an available alternative
employment practice with a less discriminatory impact that serves the
employer's legitimate business needs.
After amendments to 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-(k)(1)(A) and other rele-
vant provisions of Title VII, the disparate impact standard would not be
practically workable. In order to determine whether discrimination
caused a discriminatory impact, categorization would have to occur, and
there first has to be a group defined in order to determine whether a
disparate impact resulted from an adverse employment action taken
against that group. Providing for a disparate impact standard in this
context would re-invite entry of a form of the categorical approach and
its attendant flaws. Furnishing a disparate impact standard along with
the EQA would also enable employers and courts seeking to do so to
narrowly define groups in ways that would eliminate disparate impact
claims entirely. These difficulties render a disparate impact standard un-
der the EQA, in whole or in part (e.g. a modified disparate impact
standard), unfeasible. Thus, other standards, such as the standard for
disparate treatment, will have to serve in place of the disparate impact
standard and subject discriminating employers to scrutiny and liability
as appropriate.
C EQA Changes to Burdens of Proof and
Standards-Disparate Treatment
The standard for disparate treatment discrimination in employ-
ment would also require modification under the EQA. Currently, a
disparate treatment plaintiff must establish "that the defendant had a
discriminatory intent or motive" for a certain employment practice or
decision. 253 The plaintiff can make this demonstration via any of various
forms of direct or circumstantial evidence. 254 Because employers do not
usually openly acknowledge intentional discrimination, and the plaintiff
therefore does not have direct evidence, most plaintiffs attempt to prove
that they suffered disparate treatment discrimination via circumstantial
evidence. The Title VII complainant carries the initial burden of estab-
251. The disparate impact standard likely originated when the Supreme Court recognized
the proof problems and other difficulties inherent in establishing (often entirely sub-
jective) disparate treatment discrimination. This is further evidence of the insufficien-
insufficiency of Title VII's categorical approach. See Griggs, 401 U.S. at 431-32.
252. See 42 U.S.C. %§ 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(ii), 2000e-2(k)(1)(C).
253. See Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977, 986 (1988).
254. See Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. at 288, 288 (1989).
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lishing a prima facie case of employment discrimination.255 Under the
McDonnell Dougas framework, the plaintiff may make this prima facie
showing by establishing:
(i) that he belongs to a racial minority; (ii) that he applied and
was qualified for a job for which the employer was seeking ap-
plicants; (iii) that, despite his qualifications, he was rejected;
and (iv) that, after his rejection, the position remained open
and the employer continued to seek applicants from persons of
the complainant's qualifications."25 6
The next part of McDonnell Douglas's three-part framework shifts
the burden of proof to the employer "to articulate some legitimate, non-
discriminatory reason for the [employment decision].'257 The third part
of the framework shifts the burden of proof back to the plaintiff, who is
given an "opportunity to demonstrate by competent evidence that the
presumptively valid reasons for [the employment decision] were in fact a
cover-up for a racially discriminatory decision."258 If a plaintiff success-
fully meets the requirements set forth in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v.
Green, the plaintiff may proceed with, and might succeed on their dis-
parate treatment claim. Nonetheless, there is one notable exception-at
present, Title VII permits a form of disparate treatment discrimination
in situations where an employer can establish as a defense that a given
discriminatory employment action based on "religion, sex, or national
origin is a bona fide occupational qualification reasonably necessary to
the normal operation of that particular business or enterprise."25
Under the EQA, a plaintiff would be able to establish disparate
treatment discrimination by establishing "that the defendant had a dis-
criminatory intent or motive" and by demonstrating that the plaintiff
was the "most qualified" individual for the position, but the employer
still took adverse employment action against them (i.e. that despite be-
ing the most qualified applicant for an open position or promotion,
260
someone other than the plaintiff was selected for the position). Thus,
255. See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973).
256. See Green, 411 U.S. at 802.
257. See Green, 411 U.S. at 802.
258. See Green, 411 U.S. at 805.
259. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e)(1).
260. This "most qualified" requirement differentiates the EQA standard from that es-
poused in the Burdine case. See generally Tex. Dep't of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450
U.S. 248 (1981). In Burdine, the Supreme Court vacated and remanded the Fifth
Circuit's holding requiring that the defendant "prove by objective evidence that the
person hired or promoted was more qualified than the plaintiff." Id. at 258. The
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under the McDonnell Douglas framework, the first element of the first
prong, proving the prima facie case, would be eliminated (the plaintiff
would not need to establish that they are a member of a certain race or
class), and the remainder of the elements in the first prong would re-
main the same.26' After the plaintiff sets forth evidence regarding their
prima facie case and proves that they were qualified for the position, the
employer may present rebuttal evidence and must "articulate some legit-
imate, nondiscriminatory reason for the [employment decision]."262 This
might include comparative evidence that the plaintiff was not the "most
qualified" individual among all of the applicants for the employment.
The third prong of the McDonnell Douglas framework would no longer
be necessary, as both parties would have presented evidence on the sub-
ject of the plaintiff's qualifications by this point-the plaintiff
presenting evidence as to his or her own qualifications, and the employ-
er presenting evidence as to the qualifications of other applicants or
employees. If the plaintiff successfully persuades the trier(s) of fact
(judge or jury) that the plaintiff had the requisite qualifications, and the
employer fails to rebut the plaintiff's evidence that he or she was quali-
fied by putting forth evidence that the employee was qualified, but not
the "most qualified," applicant for the position, the plaintiff will succeed
Supreme Court stated that the Fifth Circuit's decision was an incorrect reading of Ti-
tle VII, improperly "requiring the employer to hire the minority or female applicant
whenever that person's objective qualifications were equal to those of a white male
applicant." See id. at 259. In contrast, the EQA requires that an employer not consid-
er factors other than an employee's employment "qualifications," and that the
employer hire the "most qualified" employee-the EQA does not permit or require
hiring of one class of persons over another class of persons simply because of their
membership in any given class. Although the determination of which applicant is
"most qualified" might be subject to dispute, it is my position that less discrimination
against fewer individuals will likely occur, and the risks and drawbacks are more tol-
erable when utilizing objectively-determinable factors such as an individual's
qualifications, rather than categories with their attendant problems.
261. See Green, 411 U.S. at 802 (explaining that under the EQA, the plaintiff would need
to establish the remaining three elements to meet the first prong of the McDonnell
Douglas test, leaving him to prove: (ii) that he applied and was qualified for a job for
which the employer was seeking applicants; (iii) that, despite his qualifications, he
was rejected; and (iv) that, after his rejection, the position remained open and the
employer continued to seek applicants from persons of the complainant's qualifica-
tions").
262. See Green, 411 U.S. at 802. Essentially, the employer is acting in much the same way
as they would under the second prong of the McDonnell Douglas framework, in
which the burden shifts to the employer to establish a "legitimate, nondiscriminatory
reason for the [employment decision]." See id. Under the EQA, this responsibility
falls on the employer because the employer presumably has the best access to relevant
evidence regarding all of the applicants' qualifications.
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with their Title VII disparate treatment intentional discrimination
claim.
Another by-product of the EQA and these proposed changes to Ti-
tle VII would be the elimination of the BFOQ defense to disparate
treatment discrimination. The EQA requires that employers not take
employment action based on anything other than an employee's "quali-
fications," and does not provide for an exception on any basis such as a
BFOQ.26 Under such a framework, a BFOQ would not be necessary.
The operation of other Title VII provisions would protect religious free-
doms, so the "religion" part of the BFOQ would be covered. 264 As for
the sex and national origin provisions of the BFOQ provision in Title
VII, since the "most qualified" applicant would, in theory, always be
awarded the employment in question, an employer would not need to
raise a "BFOQ-like" defense to their intentional discrimination. The
employer would not need to establish that the plaintiff was not hired
because he or she was not qualified in a manner "reasonably necessary to
the normal operation of that particular business or enterprise,"2 65 be-
cause the employer would only hire or promote employees with the
requisite qualifications.
This and other aspects of the EQA might require more detailed re-
view of employers' stated qualifications for a position by administrative
entities like the EEOC or the courts to determine which qualifications
are necessary for a position and which may be pretext for discrimina-
26tion. It seems reasonable to believe that an administrative entity or the
263. A "BFOQ" or bona fide occupational qualification is an attribute or characteristic
that employers are allowed to consider when making decisions on hiring, promoting,
or firing employees, which, if considered in other contexts, would constitute unlawful
discrimination (e.g. a mandatory retirement age for certain occupations which would
otherwise be prohibited by the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967).
264. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-1(a) (providing that Title VII does not apply to religious enti-
ties or the "employment of individuals of a particular religion to perform work
connected with the carrying on" of such religion).
265. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e)(1).
266. Not all subjective motivations constitute pretext for discrimination. For example, in
some fields where evaluation of the candidates is necessarily subjective, such as mod-
eling, candidates might be similarly qualified, but an employer might select one
candidate over another because they represent the given company better than another
candidate. Discrimination may not factor into the decision at all. Arguably then, such
situations are still adequately addressed by the EQA, which would find the model
with the "better fit for the company" the "most qualified." Under the EQA an analy-
sis of pretext would still take place in mixed motives cases, but it should be simpler
because the EQA distills permissible employment decisions down to objective, quali-
fications-based criteria. If an employer selects a candidate that is not objectively the
"most qualified" for the position, it will be evident that an impermissible factor influ-
enced the employment decision and unlawful discrimination occurred.
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courts will be relatively easily able to identify and evaluate such objective
criteria-or at least that these types of objective determinations will be
equally as challenging or easier to make than determining the often dif-
ficult-to-prove subjective motivations behind an employer's employment
decision or the requirements of a BFOQ. These entities, especially the
EEOC, have been charged with neutral and objective fact-finding, eval-
uating employment discrimination claims, and discerning employers'
true motivations for decades now. The EQA would vest the EEOC with
the power to investigate claims, fact-find, and make determinations,
subject to judicial review when necessary (similar to the Title VII review
scheme now). However, the EQA would provide easier-to-use, more
objective and discrete criteria than are presently available under Title
VII's classification scheme, with less "maneuvering" room for any entity
seeking to reach a discriminatory decision.
For example, if one of the qualifications that permissibly may be
considered in determining whether to hire an applicant is educational
attainment, and the employer states that "an appropriate education for
the job" or "college education" is required for a position, the employer
might seek to discriminate against a more educated applicant who hap-
pens to be of one race, and instead hire a less educated applicant of
another race solely because they are of the preferred race. How would
the EEOC or courts determine that the "educational" job qualification,
or the employer's decision on that basis, was pretext for discrimination?
The EEOC or courts would do so by reference to the EQA's provisions,
and taking an objective measurement of the applicants' educational
backgrounds. If the former applicant had a graduate degree in a relevant
field, but the applicant of the other race who was chosen for the posi-
tion did not, it would be apparent that the "education" qualification was
being used by the employer as pretext for discrimination. This method-
ology could be used for nearly any imaginable qualification, and it
would not be subject to the same type of maneuvering as employers and
courts have done in narrowly construing and defining a broad category
(e.g. "race") or provision (e.g. the "because of sex" provision). The EQA
operates on the assumption that almost any qualification can be reduced
to, measured by, and evaluated in objective and widely-agreed-upon
terms. For example, every reasonable person should agree that candidate
"A" who possesses a relevant graduate degree in the field in which he or
she is applying is more qualified on the basis of education than candi-
date "B" who possesses only an undergraduate degree. Although
educational attainment is merely one qualification to consider in deter-
mining which applicant is the "most qualified," decisions as to other
qualifications would be similarly straightforward, and in the end, there
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should be a clear winner who is the "most qualified," and the employer
should select that person for the position. In this way, the EQA would
more concretely hold employers accountable to their own posted job
requirements, but vest the evaluation of employers' actions in other neu-
tral and objective fact-finders and decision makers. In the end, the result
will be far less, and easier to discern, disparate treatment discrimination.
D. EQA Changes to Burdens of Proof and
Standards-Mixed Motives
Finally, in mixed motives situations, the EQA simplifies the
inquiry significantly, distilling it down to the essence of Title VII: "the
very purpose of Title VII is to promote hiring on the basis of job quali-
fications, rather than on the basis of race [or another class
characteristic]."267 Currently, if a plaintiff is unable to disprove an
employer's stated non-discriminatory reason for an employment deci-
sion in a disparate treatment case, the plaintiff may attempt to show
that a combination of legitimate and illegitimate reasons motivated the
decision-this is known as the mixed motives theory. The Price Water-
house v. Hopkins268 case initially considered the mixed motives theory.
After the decision, Congress amended Title VII to make mixed motives
cases more favorable to plaintiffs. Before the 1991 Amendment, an em-
ployer could escape liability by showing that it considered an illegitimate
factor in making an employment decision, but it would have made the
same decision regardless of the factor. Since 1991, even if there are legit-
imate factors motivating an employer's decision, if the plaintiff
establishes that an illegitimate consideration was also part of the mixed
motives behind the decision, liability may attach.2 6' However, remedies
will be limited if the employer then demonstrates that it would have
made the same decision anyway.270
Under the EQA, a mixed motives case by definition would involve
an employer considering factors other than an individual's qualifications
for employment. The first part of the mixed motives analysis would re-
main the same, requiring the plaintiff to show that an illegitimate
consideration (i.e. anything other than an individual's employment quali-
fications) motivated the employer's employment decision. If the plaintiff
successfully made such a showing, then liability for the discrimination
267. See Griggs, 401 U.S. at 434 (citing 110 CONG. REC. 7247).
268. 490 U.S. 228 (1989).
269. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m).
270. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(2)(B)(ii).
2011] 83
MICHIGAN JOURNAL OF GENDER & LAW
would attach to the employer. However, the last part of the current
analysis necessitates modification under the EQA. An employee's reme-
dies would not be limited under the EQA if the employer demonstrates
that it would have made the same decision anyway. This would be so
because if the employer made the "same decision anyway," the employer
considered factors other than an employee's qualifications-engaging in
intentional discrimination. When an employer engages in intentional
discrimination against an otherwise qualified individual, a full array of
remedies for the employee is justified.
Thus, the Employment Qualifications Approach proposes to ana-
lyze employment decisions by focusing on an individual's qualifications
for employment, within a category-less framework. The EQA would
amend the language of several provisions of Title VII, as well as the bur-
dens of proof to establish a Title VII violation in all types of cases. The
EQA seeks to ensure that workplace reality aligns with the broad reme-
dial policy goals of Title VII while accounting for changes in
employment discrimination over time.
V. THE EFFECTS OF THE EMPLOYMENT
QUALIFICATIONS APPROACH
Until Title VII protects all persons from arbitrary workplace dis-
crimination, including transgender persons, and it does so consistently
and successfully, Title VII will be more symbolic than substantive. Until
all workers can go to work each day and be judged solely on the basis of
their qualifications and not their personal characteristics, it cannot be
said that Title VII has accomplished what Congress sought to achieve in
1964: equal employment opportunities in the workplace2 11 and oppor-
tunities for workers to "compete for jobs on a nondiscriminatory
basis." 27 2 The Employment Qualifications Approach is one means pro-
posed to realize that end. Surely, no approach is perfect because no
approach will ever be able to completely eradicate discrimination from
the workplace. However, this Part discusses the potential benefits and
drawbacks that would accompany the EQA and asserts that, overall, the
EQA is the best means by which to achieve the goals of Title VII. The
271. See Griggs, 401 U.S. at 429 ("The objective of Congress in the enactment of Title VII
is plain from the language of the statute. It was to achieve equality of employment
opportunities.").
272. Developments in the Law, Employment Discrimination and Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, 84 HARv. L. REV. 1111, 1166 (1971).
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potential benefits and drawbacks of implementing the EQA are dis-
cussed below.
A. Potential Benefits of the Employment Qualfications Approach
This section asserts that implementing the EQA would engender
numerous benefits including: accomplishing the goals of Title VII and
more; decreased or eliminated resentment toward protected classes of
persons; more efficient administration and forward-thinking by Con-
gress; and economic and other benefits for employers. Each asserted
benefit is discussed in turn below.
1. Accomplishing the Goals of Title VII and More
All individuals need and deserve equal opportunities to earn a liv-
ing and to provide for themselves and their dependents. As previously
explained, without employment an individual cannot afford basic neces-
sities such as shelter and nutritious food, cannot hope to obtain a good
education, cannot afford health care, and cannot even contemplate dis-
cretionary purchases that enrich and invigorate life. An ability to obtain
employment on equal terms as other similarly-qualified candidates, or to
maintain employment free from discrimination and harassment, is of
paramount importance to having a good quality of life. Under its cur-
rent categorical formulation, Title VII does not provide equal
employment opportunities and non-discriminatory conditions of em-
ployment to all workers, but the EQA potentially could. No regulatory
scheme will likely ever eradicate all discrimination in the workplace, but
the EQA would result in less discrimination against fewer individuals
than Title VII as currently constructed. The EQA would do so by sim-
plifying the inquiry, focusing Title VII on an individual's qualifications
to do a job, rather than arbitrarily covering only some individuals or
assigning individuals into classes that time and again are defined and
interpreted narrowly to avoid granting protections to qualified workers.
Under the EQA, individuals would be evaluated only on the basis of
their qualifications, with the "most qualified" individual selected for a
position, promotion or the like. All individuals would finally have equal
employment opportunities and protections from workplace discrimina-
tion, no matter their personal characteristics.27 Because the EQA does
273. In theory, the EQA would provide equal employment opportunities as well as em-
ployment non-discrimination protections to everyone. However, it is noted that
2011]1 85
MICHIGAN JOURNAL OF GENDER & LAW
not confine employment non-discrimination protections to discrete
classes of persons, which are thereafter narrowly interpreted and defined
by courts and employers to deny protections to otherwise qualified em-
ployees, the EQA would be best-positioned to achieve the remedial goals
that inspired and continue to animate Title VII. In these ways, the EQA
provides the best means possible to accomplish the goals of Title VII
and more, and do so for more individuals than the categorically con-
strained Title VII does now.
2. Decreased or Eliminated Resentment Toward Protected Classes
From sociologists to Supreme Court Justices, scholars have recog-
nized that category-based categorical systems like Title VII intrinsically
divide people and cause resentment toward protected classes of persons.
History repeatedly has demonstrated that so long as distinctions be-
tween individuals exist, people will find a way to justify, perpetuate, and
make judgments based upon them. The EQA would eliminate from Ti-
tle VII such arbitrary and divisive classifications, and prohibit
employment considerations or decisions based upon any factor other
than an individual's qualifications for a position. Bitter individuals
claiming that they missed out on an employment opportunity because a
person in a protected class was selected on the basis of their membership
in the protected class would no longer be able to make such assertions.
Under the EQA, no employee would be able to assert that "he only got
persons from previously disadvantaged backgrounds (pre-EQA) have lacked and
might continue to suffer from a lack of access to future-oriented mechanisms to at-
tain certain qualifications or merit-based benchmarks. For example, an individual
from a financially or otherwise-disadvantaged background pre-EQA might not be
able to enter or graduate from college and, as a result, might not be able to obtain
certain jobs, or be deemed the "most qualified" compared to individuals from more
advantaged backgrounds. Post-EQA, these individuals might continue to struggle
within the EQA's qualifications and merit-based employment system. Such individu-
als, if not deemed the "most qualified," might claim that an applicant only benefited
from an employment decision because of his or her privileged background. The EQA
would likely prohibit workplace affirmative action or similar policies to remedy this
situation, but it is possible that affirmative action policies in education or other con-
texts might be available. However, such considerations and discussion of affirmative
action programs is beyond the scope of this Article, since that discussion itself would
likely require a separate article just for that purpose. The effect of the EQA on sexual
harassment claims, which are traditionally brought under the "because of sex" or like
provisions, also is beyond consideration within the scope of this Article. For the pre-
sent, it is assumed that voluntary affirmative action programs would be prohibited in
employment but permitted elsewhere, and that legal precedents heretofore decided
would provide a means by which sexual harassment victims could bring claims and
obtain relief.
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the promotion because he is X" (where X denotes membership in a pro-
tected class). Individuals would know that they and their fellow
applicants would be judged solely on the basis of merit and qualifica-
tions, and group bias and resentment on this basis would lessen or
disappear as a result. Thus, the EQA would avoid all of these pitfalls of
divisive category-based systems and reap the benefits of diminished
group bias, increased understanding across groups of people, and de-
creased discrimination in the workplace.
3. More Efficient Administration and Forward-Thinking
by Congress
Adopting the EQA would lead to more efficient administration by
Congress by redrafting Title VII to protect more individuals with broad-
er, clearer language, and it would not require constant amendments. The
EQA would also address current forms of discrimination while taking a
proactive approach to preventing discrimination in the future. As cur-
rently formulated, Title VII's categorical approach requires a great
expenditure of congressional time, resources and political capital to
amend Title VII any time Congress desires to protect a new class of per-
sons. Amending Title VII has proven nearly impossible, and when
amendments have been made, it has sometimes taken decades and nu-
merous failed attempts. This method of legislating is inefficient and does
not employ a forward-thinking approach (i.e. an approach that would
anticipate and meet the needs of currently unprotected groups of indi-
viduals suffering discrimination before the discrimination against such
individuals is widespread and more difficult to remedy). Furthermore,
when attempts to redefine extant categories of protected individuals un-
der Title VII have failed, efforts have been made to pass stand-alone
legislation to protect those individuals and those efforts have also usually
failed or taken decades to accomplish. In the meantime, those groups
and anyone unprotected under Title VII's categorical framework remain
without equal employment opportunities and non-discrimination
protections. Title VII's categorical approach is intolerably inefficient and
is not forward-thinking, to the continuing detriment of thousands of
qualified employees, transgender and otherwise. The EQA would afford
superior congressional administration and forward-thinking insight to
the benefits of all employees and individuals. Using clear, broad lan-
guage, the EQA would ensure that all individuals enjoy equal
employment opportunities or non-discrimination protections without
the need to amend Title VII for every new or different class of person.
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The EQA would also make it more difficult for would-be discriminators
to maneuver around the statutory language or pass through loopholes to
discriminate against otherwise-qualified individuals. Thus, adopting the
EQA would lead to more efficient administration and forward-thinking
by Congress than Title VII does currently.
4. Economic and Other Benefits for Employers
Put into action, the Employment Qualifications Approach would
give rise to several substantial economic and other benefits for employ-
ers. By eliminating the categories in Title VII, requiring that the
employer only consider an individual's qualifications for a job and that
the employer select the "most qualified" person, the EQA would reduce
category-related costs to employers-such as the costs of running af-
firmative action programs and litigation defense-and confer an
immeasurable benefit of ensuring that employers have the most-
qualified workforce possible. Employers would be shrewd to support the
actualization of the EQA because employers would incur fewer and less
costly fines for Title VII violations, and employers would be able to hire
the "most qualified" workforce available, without being "made to hire or
promote" a less-qualified or unqualified applicant solely because of a
personal characteristic or membership in a protected class. This will also
benefit transgender employees and others currently unprotected by Title
VII, who often suffer employment discrimination. If a transgender em-
ployee is the "most qualified" for the job, they should receive the job,
the promotion, or the benefit of the employment decision under the
EQA. If a transgender employee is the "most qualified" and he or she
still suffers discrimination, the EQA broadens the available remedies.
The category-less framework of the EQA would truly ensure equal
employment opportunities for all employees, as well as economic and
other benefits for employers who would have the autonomy and free-
dom to make employment decisions without apprehension about Title
VII's categorical affirmative action "catch-22"27 or other category-based
274. The case of Ricci v. DeStefano presents one instance of the Title VII categorical af-
firmative action "catch-22," as the Author terms it: an employer cannot violate Title
VII by intentionally discriminating against a member of a protected class, but an em-
ployer can also not impermissibly confer benefits upon some members of a protected
class and not others. This leaves many employers who seek to remedy past discrimi-
nation in a "catch-22" situation because any such action the employer takes will, by
definition, intentionally discriminate against some group of individuals in violation
of Title VII. In Ricci, the City of New Haven sought to remedy an unrepresentative
firefighter workforce by discarding test results that failed to increase the minority
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concerns and constraints. Thus, employers (and employees alike) should
support the EQA because the approach would give rise to several sub-
stantial economic and other benefits.
5. The Benefits of Anti-Classification and Anti-Subordination
Schemes and More
Until now, employment anti-discrimination jurisprudence has largely
consisted of two related schools of thought: (1) anti-classification theory;
and (2) anti-subordination theory. Anti-classification theory advances a
view that "inaugurates the modern equal protection tradition . . . [and]
also express[es] the normative conviction that anticlassification embod-
ies . . . the value of individualism." 275 As Justice Thomas put it in
Missouri v. Jenkins,276 under the anti-classification theory of anti-
discrimination law, "the government cannot discriminate among citizens
on the basis of race [or classification]. . . . At the heart of this interpreta-
tion of the Equal Protection Clause lies the principle that the
government must treat citizens as individuals, and not as members of
racial, ethnic or religious groups."277 On the other hand, anti-
subordination theory holds "the conviction that it is wrong for the state
to engage in practices that enforce the inferior social status of historically
oppressed groups." 278 The anti-subordination view prohibits actions that
"perpetuate . . . the subordinate status of a specially disadvantaged
,,279group.
Some scholars, such as Professor Reva B. Siegel, have chronicled the
way in which anti-subordination theory predominated in early anti-
discrimination law, largely from the Reconstruction Era until the mid-
1960s, after which point the anti-classification theory arrived on the
scene to supplement anti-discrimination jurisprudence.280 As Siegel
notes, anti-subordination theory "played a central role in justifying
Brown [v. Board of Education] throughout the 1950s [and 1960s and
ranks of the firefighter officer staff By acting to benefit one group, the City caused a
detriment to another group, and was held to be in violation of Title VII. See generally
Ricci, 129 S. Ct. 2658 (2009).
275. Reva B. Siegel, Equality Talk: Antisubordination and Anticlassification Values in Con-
stitutional Struggles over Brown, 117 HARv. L. REv. 1470, 1472 (2004).
276. 515 U.S. 70 (1995).
277. 515 U.S. at 120-21 (Thomas, J., concurring).
278. Siegel, supra note 275.
279. Siegel, supra note 275 (citing Owen M. Fiss, Groups and the Equal Protection Clause,
5 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 107, 108, 157 (1976)).
280. See, e.g., Siegel, supra note 275.
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1970s]."28' Anti-subordination theory values, premised on the idea that
one group should not be advantaged at the expense of another, continue
to play a "central role" in anti-discrimination law today, as evidenced,
for exam le, by the Grutter v. Bollinger282 decision of 2003. Brown283 and
Grutter8 both held that disparate treatment, subordinating the rights
and privileges of one group of students to another in the education set-
ting (in the contexts of segregation and affirmative action, respectively),
constituted an impermissible violation of the Equal Protection Clause.
Both decisions demanded that all students be treated equally, but spoke
in terms of the class memberships of the individuals. By contrast, Title
VII exemplifies anti-classification theory. Title VII, promulgated in
1964, identifies protected traits that form the basis of classifications (e.g.
race), on which basis employers are prohibited from discriminating.285
At first glance, anti-classification and anti-subordination theories
may in some ways appear to contradict each other, and yet, there is sig-
nificant overlap. At bottom, both strike at the same harms and have
similar aims. Both schemes disapprove of and seek to prohibit disparate
treatment among classes of people. Both theories do so on the basis of
an individual's characteristics and membership in certain groups. How-
ever, anti-classification theory advocates achieving equal protection and
equal opportunities through "colorblindness,"28 6  while anti-
subordination theory prohibits discrimination on the basis of group
membership but sometimes permits "color vision" to remedy past harms
against certain groups (e.g. through the use of affirmative action pro-
grams).
Because both anti-classification and anti-subordination theories
classify and differentiate among individuals by their membership in
certain delineated classes, both approaches fall victim to all of the same
281. See, Siegel, supra note 275.
282. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003).
283. See Brown v. Bd. ofEduc., 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954) ("[Slegregation is a denial of the
equal protection of the laws.").
284. See Grutter, 539 U.S. 306, 342 (2003) ("[R]acial classifications, however compelling
their goals, are potentially so dangerous that they may be employed no more broadly
than the interest demands. Enshrining a permanent justification for racial preferences
would offend this fundamental equal protection principle.").
285. See Jennifer L. Levi, Misapplying Equality Theories: Dress Codes at Work, 19 YAU J.L.
& FEMINIsM 353, 360 (2008).
286. United States Supreme Court Chief Justice John Roberts stated this principle in
Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School District No. 1, 551 U.S. 701
(2007) (prohibiting the assignment of students to public schools solely to achieve ra-
cial integration and declining to recognize racial balancing as a compelling
government interest). As Chief Justice Roberts put it, "[tihe way to stop discrimina-
tion on the basis of race is to stop discriminating on the basis of race." See id. at 748.
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flaws discussed herein that plague categorical classification schemes.
Such flaws include: resentment toward protected class groups by those
who are not afforded the same protections or denied opportunities due
to a lack of protected class status; the ability of those who seek
to discriminate to maneuver around class definitions; under-
inclusiveness-the failure of categories to encompass and protect all who
would reasonably be expected to be members of a category (e.g. LGBT
individuals exclusion from Title VII's "sex" category); dehumanizing
valuation and relegating some individuals to second-class status; the
ability of courts to interpret categorical statutes as "swords" or "shields"
to grant or deny protections as desired; and high costs to employers to
ensure compliance with such statutory regimes.
The Employment Qualifications Approach proposes a different,
third conception of anti-discrimination law, asserting that the best course
is to focus on the "what" of employment discrimination law instead of
focusing on the "who." Stated another way, both the anti-classification
theory and anti-subordination theory of anti-discrimination law concen-
trate on group dynamics and assign individuals different group
memberships depending on their personal characteristics. On the other
hand, the EQA shifts the focus from group membership to objective crite-
ria possessed by individuals, ignoring the groups to which individuals
might otherwise belong.
Some might claim that the EQA is a variation on the anti-
classification theme. However, the EQA is more than a means to stop
discrimination on certain bases by taking action to "stop discriminating"
on those bases, as Chief Justice Roberts might put it.287 The EQA is an
affirmative shift in focus to the individual and objective characteristics,
rather than group membership and group-level dynamics. The EQA
does not classify and grant protections to some individuals but not oth-
ers. The EQA would not subordinate, advantage, or disadvantage any
group at the expense of another. The EQA emphasizes an individual's
abilities, experience, and other objective qualifications and attempts to
provide discrete criteria by which employers can make employment de-
cisions. By doing so, the EQA focuses on an individual's fit for the job
and the organization (the "what"), rather than on the individual's mem-
bership in certain groups (the "who"). To merely "stop discriminating"
would not change the group-level focus inherent to the anti-
classification and anti-subordination theories. The EQA displaces
groups as a by-product of shifting to an individual focus, and it provides
287. See Parents Involved, 551 U.S. 701, 748 (2007) ("The way to stop discrimination on
the basis of race is to stop discriminating on the basis of race.").
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discrete and objective criteria by which to measure individuals' fitness
for employment, rather than just eliminating all groups and leaving a
void resulting in a lack of measures or direction with which employers
can make decisions. Getting rid of group classifications alone will not
prevent discrimination. However, removing constraints on anti-
discrimination protections (i.e. group classifications) and supplementing
the field with directives that will allow employers to make fairer, better
employment decisions based solely on what is relevant (a candidate's
qualifications), will do so.
The EQA possesses all of the benefits of the anti-classification and
anti-subordination schemes, and is consistent with the aims of both the-
ories, but is not constrained and flawed by classifications. Where an
anti-classification statute like Title VII would prohibit discrimination
on the basis of membership in only a few discrete classes, the EQA can
prohibit discrimination on any basis not related to qualifications, af-
fording a much broader basis of protection. To take another example,
an anti-subordination scheme would prohibit advantaging individuals
of one class in employment decisions over individuals of another class,
furthering class resentment and hostility on the sole basis of member-
ship in certain groups, among other problems. In contrast, the EQA
would afford employment opportunities to the most qualified individ-
ual, whether Black, white, or of any other race-irrespective of group
membership. Thus, the Employment Qualifications Approach is a
more appropriate, and likely a more effective, means to find truly qual-
ified employees and tackle employment discrimination.
B. Potential Drawbacks and Counterarguments to the
Employment Qualifications Approach
This section addresses potential drawbacks to, and the likely
counterarguments against, the Employment Qualifications Approach.
It argues that even if all of these assertions were true, the enumerated
benefits of implementing the EQA would still outweigh these draw-
backs, and the EQA should be implemented. This section addresses a
few contentions: that transgender persons do not merit employment
non-discrimination protections and that granting protections to
transgender individuals will lead to a host of horrible results; that the
EQA would lead to increased litigation of individual employment dis-
crimination claims; that employers will be denied autonomy in
employment decision-making (i.e. the ability to refuse to hire certain
employees for reasons including moral opposition or dislike of the
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"type of person" that the employee is, such as disliking a transgender
person on the basis of their gender identity);288 that stand-alone legisla-
tion or amendments to Title VII within its categorical framework
would be more appropriate; and that the un-categorical framework
reduces individuals to a sum of their qualifications in an undesirable
way. Each is addressed in turn.
1. Opposition to Employment Non-Discrimination Protections for
Transgender Persons: The Slippery Slope
to the "Parade of Horribles"
A popular argument against granting any equal rights or protec-
tions for LGBT persons is that doing so will lead down a slippery slope
to a frightening and varied host of horrible results. This argument is in-
vective and incorrect, especially when taking into account the mechanics
and practical application of the Employment Qualifications Approach.
Opponents of equal rights for transgender persons and others in the
LGBT community often argue something to the effect of: "but if we pro-
tect transgender people, next we'll have to protect polygamists, people
who engage in incest, or people who engage in bestiality, or "X" type of
other often socially unpopular people, and that will lead to the end of the
world."289 This is only a slight exaggeration of the traditional anti-LGBT
equality argument.290 It is likely that this argument would again be
raised in opposition to employment non-discrimination protections for
transgender persons and others. This same argument has been popping
up for as long as equal rights movements have been in existence-
decades ago, the slippery slope argument was frequently employed in
288. See also supra note 273 (discussing the potential prohibition or loss of voluntary af-
firmative action programs in employment).
289. See, e.g., Hema Chatlani, In Defense of Marriage: Why Same-Sex Marriage Will Not
Lead Us Down a Slippery Slope Toward the Legalization ofPolygamy, 6 APPALACHIAN J.
L. 101, 128 (2006) (discussing this argument as it is deployed in the marriage equali-
ty debate context).
290. See, e.g., Elizabeth F. Emens, Monogamy's Law: Compulsory Monogamy and Poly-
amorous Existence, 29 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 277, 279-80 (2004)
(discussing the "oft-noted propensity of gay rights opponents to claim that [LGBT
equality] leads to a parade of horribles such as . .. the legalization of incest, bestiality,
pedophilia and polygamy") (citing George F. Will, Culture and What Courts Can't
Do, WASH. POST, Nov. 30, 2003, at B7; Maura I. Strassberg, The Challenge ofPost-
Modern Polygamy: Considering Polyamory, 31 CAP. UNIv. L. REv. 439, 439 (2003)
(noting conservatives' frequent use of analogies to polygamy when discussing same-
sex marriage)).
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opposition to interracial marriages.29' Fortunately, this argument can be
overcome with a review of the historical record and analysis of the EQA.
History proves unequivocally that granting equal protection of the laws
to vulnerable groups of individuals subject to discrimination, contempt,
and abuse does not lead down a slippery slope to horrible things. Once
Loving v. Virginia292 ended race-based legal restrictions on marriage, the
legalization of polygamous marriages did not follow. Bigamy remains
illegal, and bigamy laws continue to be enforced today.293 Similarly,
granting persons with disabilities employment protections did not lead
to the legalization of bestiality. Other more realistic arguments about the
"horrible" consequences of the EQA would surely be raised as well. Em-
ployers might claim that employment non-discrimination protections
for transgender persons might require the employer to provide expensive
insurance coverage for sex reassignment surgery. However, the EQA
makes no such mandate. Additionally, employment non-discrimination
protections for transgender persons would not "ruin" public restrooms
or risk injury to persons using restrooms also utilized by transgender
individuals-there is no evidence to substantiate this concern either.
There are legion examples of the flaws with this slippery slope "parade of
horribles" argument. History demonstrates that affording more individ-
uals equal rights leads to positive results (especially for the previously
unprotected individuals). The case would be no different if employment
non-discrimination protections were granted to transgender persons.
Granting transgender individuals equal employment rights would nei-
ther lead to the legalization of polygamy or any of the other
aforementioned "horribles," nor would affording transgender persons
equal employment protections lead to protections for other individuals
on the basis of what some might call other "ridiculous" bases.294 This is
especially true in light of the mechanics and practical operation of the
EQA, which would not permit employers to consider any factors other
than an employee's qualifications for employment. The very nature of
the Employment Qualifications Approach proscribes granting any group
"special rights," and the class-less nature of the EQA would prevent ex-
panding class protections, precipitating a slippery slope to a parade of
291. See Mark Strasser, Loving, Baehr, and the Right to Marry: On Legal Argumentation
and Sophistical Rhetoric, 24 NOVA L. REv. 769, 788 (2000).
292. 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
293. See, e.g., Mike Fleeman, Police Investigating Sister Wives Stars for Felony Bigamy, PEO-
PLE (Sept. 28, 2010), http://www.people.com/people/article/0,,20429667,00.html.
294. For instance, some opponents of non-discrimination protections for transgender
persons might argue that "if we protect transgender people, next we'll be protecting
people with tattoos, dog owners, and all other sorts of people-anyone that asserts
their group should have 'special rights.'"
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horribles. Thus, this argument fails per analysis and historical experi-
ence.
2. The Risk for Increased Individual Litigation
One of the potential drawbacks to the EQA would be a risk for an
increase in the quantity of individual-scale Title VII litigation. As stat-
ed earlier, in some class actions courts have interpreted and defined
Title VII's protected classes very narrowly in a manner detrimental to
individual plaintiffs, 295 and often narrowing the Title VII classes to the
point where individuals "find it impossible to bring an individual suit or
narrow class action even when he has a meritorious claim."296 If success-
fully implemented, the Employment Qualifications Approach would
remove the class constraints on aggrieved individuals seeking relief from
employment discrimination. 297 This might result in an increase in Title
VII litigation by individuals.
As of now, Title VII litigation centers on a plaintiffs membership
(or exclusion) from an enumerated protected class, and litigation is
limited by those class constraints-an individual may allege employ-
ment discrimination on any of innumerable bases, but only claims
made on bases covered by Title VII will be able to proceed. The EQA
would eliminate Title VII's class distinctions and restrictions on em-
ployment discrimination claims, allowing an individual to bring a claim
of employment discrimination on any impermissible basis (any basis
aside from the individual's employment qualifications). For instance,
while an employee cannot successfully bring a Title VII suit alleging dis-
crimination against him or her as a transgender person now, an
employee could bring such a suit under the EQA. An employee could
also bring a suit alleging discrimination on the basis of political affilia-
tion, marital status, appearance or any of the various bases not presently
protected by Title VII. This broadened legal right would almost certain-
ly result in an increase in the quantity and types of employment
1. .. .298litigation suits brought.
295. See generally Certifying Classes and Subclasses in Title VII Suits, supra note 185.
296. Certifying Classes and Subclasses in Title VII Suits, supra note 185, at 626.
297. The effect that the EQA would have on class action litigation remains to be discussed
or determined, but is beyond the scope of this Article at this time. As class action liti-
gation focuses on membership in a class, which runs counter to the class-less
framework of the EQA, it is possible that class action litigation (at least under Title
VII) would not be allowable in conjunction with the EQA.
298. This fact is evident from the increase in complaints filed with the EEOC after other
instances in which Title VII was broadened to afford protections to a new group of
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The potential risk of increased litigation under the EQA, even if re-
alized, would likely not be overwhelming. This is so for two reasons:
(1) administrative measures are in place to rule out unmeritorious claims
before such claims drain judicial resources, preventing many potentially
frivolous employment discrimination claims that might be brought on
presently-unprotected bases after implementation of the EQA; and
(2) courts would develop a body of case law to exclude frivolous or un-
supportable claims and use other judicial powers to direct meritorious
claims to successful adjudication.
At present, the EEOC is charged with administrative oversight au-
thority over Title VII claims.299 Claimants are required to file charges of
unlawful employment discrimination with the EEOC within a certain
time period to protect their rights, and must receive approval to proceed
with civil litigation. 00 These and other administrative mechanisms cur-
rently present in Title VII, which would remain unchanged after EQA
implementation, serve to rule out unmeritorious claims and ensure the
efficient consideration, administration, and adjudication of Title VII
employment discrimination claims. If the EQA resulted in an increase in
EEOC filings, additional resources could be committed to take care of
the surge.
Additionally, even if the EQA was put into action and individuals
brought numerous employment discrimination claims on a multitude
of bases, some of which might not be supported by the evidence,
courts would quickly develop a body of case law to preclude similar
unmeritorious claims in the future. It would not take long for courts to
develop a body of precedent that would exclude frivolous or unmerito-
rious claims (e.g. claims by numerous individuals such as a claim like "I
suffered employment discrimination on the basis of my membership in
an Ultimate Frisbee club" when the employer had no knowledge of the
employee's participation), and once developed, the body of law would,
to some extent, self-govern Title VII claims and render the caseload
manageable.
To some extent, an increase in individual litigation is a desired ob-
jective of the EQA since it seeks to permit individuals to bring claims of
employment discrimination on numerous bases under which they are
not presently able to proceed (e.g. transgender status). Thus, administra-
individuals, or after the enactment of other statutes with a similar purpose such as the
ADA. EQuAL EMP'T OPPORTUNITY COMM'N, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964
Charges (includes concurrent charges with ADEA, ADA and EPA) FY 1997-FY 2009,
available at http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/statistics/enforcement/titlevii.cfm.
299. See generally 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-4.
300. See generally 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5.
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tive measures already present in Title VII, as well as traditionally availa-
ble judicial methods of claims adjudication and litigation
administration"' would ensure that the risk of increased individual liti-
gation would not outweigh the benefits of the EQA.
3. Potential Autonomy Concerns for Employers
Another popular argument against granting equal rights for politi-
cally less favored or controversial groups (e.g., in this instance,
employment non-discrimination protections for transgender persons) is
that doing so would impinge on employer "autonomy." Employers op-
posed to affording equal employment opportunities and protections
have often invoked this argument as one objection to broadening em-
ployee civil rights. During the Civil Rights Movement era, Title VII
opponents argued that if legislation such as Title VII was enacted, the
"President [and federal government] would be granted the power to se-
riously impair . . . [t]he right of employers 'to hire or discharge any
individual' and to determine 'his compensation, terms, condition, or
privileges of employment. 3 02 Further, opponents of equal employment
opportunities argued that legislation such as Title VII "would be far
reaching, encroaching on employer prerogatives and employment at
will." 3  While some employers sincerely harbored these concerns, 304 for
other employers, these assertions were a proxy for an argument on be-
half of the employers' ability to intentionally discriminate against classes
of persons they disliked.' Both the sincere and insincere sides of the
301. See Margaret H. Lemos, The Consequences of Congress's Choice of Delegate: Judicial and
Agency Interpretations of Title VII, 63 VAND. L. REv. 363 (2010) (discussing adminis-
trative and judicial oversight, administration, and interpretation of Title VII).
302. See Chad Derum & Karen Engle, The Rise of The Personal Animosity Presumption in
Title VII and the Return to "No Cause" Employment, 81 TEx. L. REv. 1177, 1212-13
(2003) (citing H.R. Rep. No. 88-914 (1963), reprinted in United States Equal Em-
ployment Opportunities Commission, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF TITLES VII AND XI
OF CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1964).
303. Derum & Engle, supra note 302, at 1212 (quoting David B. Filvaroff & Raymond E.
Wolfinger, The Origin and Enactment of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, in LEGACIES OF
THE 1964 CIVIL RIGHTS ACT 9, 22 (Bernard Grofman ed., 2000)).
304. Derum & Engle, supra note 302, at 1213 (citing 110 CONG. REc. 1620 (1964)
(statement of Rep. Abernethy)).
305. Derum & Engle, supra note 302, at 1212-13 (citing Randall Kennedy, The Struggle
for Racial Equality in Public Accommodations, in LEGACIES OF THE 1964 CIVIL RIGHTS
ACT 156, 161 (Bernard Grofman ed., 2000). "Kennedy observes that combating . . .
discrimination in places of public accommodation ... was less troublesome, since
such discrimination was a 'simple matter of naked racism or acquiescence to naked
[discrimination].' Kennedy notes further that '[e]mployers, by contrast, who equate
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employer autonomy faction would likely oppose the EQA, which,
among other things, would grant equal employment opportunities and
non-discrimination protections to transgender persons (or as these em-
ployers would characterize it, deny employers the autonomy to inten-
intentionally discriminateso or make employment decisions regarding
transgender persons). However, both sides' arguments can be defeated.
As for the insincere employers motivated by discriminatory animus,
as one scholar has argued, at the very least, intentional discrimination in
employment is wrongful because it demeans those who are discriminat-
ed against.307 For this reason alone, it is impermissible to justify
opposition to legislation because of a desire to intentionally discriminate
on the basis of a person's characteristics (unrelated to their qualifica-
tions). As for the employers holding a sincere concern regarding a loss of
race with preferred or undesirable traits, experiences, or skills rationalize their deci-
sions as a matter of 'good business' rather than racism [make discriminatory motives
more difficult to detect and remedy]"').
306. Some equal rights opponents have explicitly stated their opposition to Title VII,
ENDA and similar legislation precisely because such legislation would deny employ-
ers the freedom to discriminate against whom they wish. See Shannon H. Tan, Note,
When Steve is Fired for Becoming Susan: Why Courts and Legislators Need to Protect
Transgender Employees From Discrimination, 37 STETSON L. REv. 579, 608-09
(2008), discussing the way in which
groups such as Concerned Women for America contend that ENDA
would force religious business owners to hire gay and transgender people in
spite of their belief that homosexuality and transgenderism are 'sinful' . . .
This argument parallels that of Title VII critics, who once contended that
employers should have the freedom to discriminate against African-
Americans.
Id. at 608-09 (citing Concerned Women for America, CWA: ENDA Would Disman-
tle First Amendment Liberties, CHRISTIAN NEwswIRE (May 11, 2007); John J.
Donohue III, Advocacy Versus Analysis in Assessing Employment Discrimination Law,
44 STAN. L. REv. 1583, 1583 (1992)). Some critics of the EQA might suggest that
the EQA would serve as a prior restraint on symbolic speech by those who oppose
hiring a transgender or other individual on moral or religious grounds. Others might
object to the EQA because of a desire to intentionally discriminate for "good rea-
sons, such as not hiring an individual with a prior child sexual assault conviction for
a job requiring frequent interaction with children. Courts would have the latitude to
consider such situations and prohibit discrimination based on insincerely-held beliefs
and concerns about a loss of autonomy, or to find that, for example, an individual
with an established history and propensity to harm children is not the "most quali-
fied" individual to work with them. In this way, the EQA serves to prevent ill-
motivated discrimination under the guise of legitimate motives, but allows courts
leeway to take into account exceptional situations while still focusing on the individ-
ual's objectively identifiable qualifications for employment.
307. See DEBORAH HELLMAN, WHEN IS- DISCRIMINATION WRONG? 7 (Harv. Univ. Press
2008) ("It is morally wrong to distinguish among people on the basis of a given at-
tribute when doing so demeans any of the people affected.").
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autonomy in employment decision-making, this concern is too un-
founded and insufficient to defeat the EQA. The EQA only requires
that employers consider individuals' qualifications for employment,
not that employers make any particular employment decisions (i.e. an
employer can choose not to hire anyone, but if they hire someone,
must hire the "most qualified" individual). Further, in this way, the
House of Representatives intended for Title VII to be like the EQA-a
"House report discussing the requirements of Title VII observed that
the proper role of the EEOC under the statute would be to 'make cer-
tain that the channels of employment are openfed by employers] to
persons regardless of [their membership in enumerated classes] and
that jobs in companies or membership in unions are strictly filled on the
basis of qualifcation.""'s
The EQA is neither a quota edict nor an affirmative action plan-
the EQA merely requires that employers evaluate individuals on the ba-
sis of their qualifications to do a job, and not other irrelevant,
prejudicial, or discriminatory considerations. Employers would retain
the same ability to make employment decisions "at-will" under the EQA
as they do under the current Title VII regime, with the only limitation
being that an employer could not discriminate against an otherwise-
qualified applicant on any basis aside from their qualifications.3 09 This
might mean that an employer cannot refuse to hire a qualified applicant
who is a reformed domestic abuser, solely because of his history of do-
mestic abuse. However, an employer can refuse to hire the individual if
they are not the "most qualified" applicant, or terminate them for inad-
equate job performance, or make other qualifications-based
employment decisions, and criminal or other law will have to handle the
behavioral aspects of the individual's actions.
Thus, the EQA would only limit employer decision-making to the
extent that an employer would consider illegitimate and irrelevant factors
and make discriminatory employment decisions, and it is the position of
308. Derum & Engle, supra note 302, at 1214 (citing H.R. Rep. No. 88-914, pt. 2
(1963), reprinted in United States Equal Employment Opportunities Commission,
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF TITLES VII AND XI OF CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1964).
309. If "at-will" employment is defined to mean that an employer can make any
employment decision on any arbitrary basis, then both Title VII and the EQA
impinge on "at-will" employment to some extent, as do a variety of other
employment laws, including the ADA. In that Title VII prohibits employment
decision-making on the basis of several categorical characteristics, Title VII limits
employment "at-will" decision-making. However, it is the position of this Article that
the EQA's one constraint on true employment "at-will" decision-making (that of
qualifications) is reasonable and does not impinge on employer autonomy, or at least
does so far less than the current Title VII regime and other employment laws.
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this Article and Congress that employers should not have the autonomy
to discriminate based on such factors anyway. As for employers' autonomy
regarding legitimate bases for employment decision-making, the EQA
would preserve that autonomy and the ability to make any employment
decision that only takes into account job qualifications. Therefore, neither
sincere nor insincere autonomy concerns of employers are sufficient to
overcome the benefits of the EQA.
4. Stand-Alone Legislation as a Vehicle for Change, Instead
of a Reformulated Title VII
The preceding three subsections considered arguments that might
be raised in opposition to the implementation of the Employment
Qualifications Approach-arguments that would almost certainly be
brought by opponents to equal employment opportunities and non-
discrimination protections for transgender persons. In contrast, this and
the subsequent subsection address justifications that might be raised for
opposition to the EQA, but that would likely be brought by individuals
who do not take issue with granting opportunities and protections for
transgender persons, but the method of actualization itself (i.e., the
EQA).
In its current formulation, Title VII has failed the transgender
community" and others not protected by the statute's discrete catego-
ries. Considering transgender individuals specifically, the vast majority
of courts have considered transgender plaintiffs' Title VII "because of
sex" discrimination claims only to dismiss and discount them, while uti-
lizing the "language of monstrosity" and other degrading forms of
discourse to describe transgender persons.' Some scholars contend that
stand-alone legislation would be a more effective means by which to
achieve equal employment opportunities and non-discrimination pro-
310. See supra Part I.B.
311. See, e.g., Abigail W. Lloyd, Defining the Human: Are Transgendered People Strangers to
the Law?, 20 BERKELEY J. GENDER L. & JusT. 150, 162-63 (2005) (discussing the
language used by the Seventh Circuit in the Ulane case, including: "Ulane is entitled
to any personal belief about her sexual identity she desires. After the surgery, hor-
mones, appearance changes . . . it may be that society . . . considers Ulane to be
female. But even if one believes that a woman can be so easily created from what re-
mains of a man, that does not decide this case.") (citing Ulane v. E. Airlines, Inc.,
742 F.2d 1081, 1087 (7th Cir. 1984) (footnote omitted)); see also Carolyn E. Coffey,
Note, Battling Gender Orthodoxy: Prohibiting Discrimination on the Basis of Gender
Identity and Expression in the Courts and in the Legislatures, 7 N.Y. CiTy. L. REV. 161,
179 (2004) ("attempts to gain transgender equality in the federal court system have
been unsuccessful").
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tections for uncovered groups such as transgender persons.312 The argu-
ments in favor of one specific piece of stand-alone legislation, the
Employment Non-Discrimination Act ("ENDA"), will be considered
herein, because the arguments in favor of ENDA align with the argu-
ments that have been cited of other pieces of stand-alone legislation
aimed at affording similar protections to other groups.
As early as 1974, members of the U.S. House of Representatives in-
troduced legislation proposing to add sexual orientation non-
discrimination protections to The Civil Rights Act of 1964.3' The 1974
bill failed to make it out of committee, failing just like all subsequent
attempts to amend The Civil Rights Act for this purpose."' After years
of repeated failures to amend The Civil Rights Act, in 1994 "advocates
switched tactics" and proposed stand-alone legislation that would pro-
hibit employment discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation,
EDNA."' It was not until 2007 that gender identity
non-discrimination protections would be included in a proposed version
of ENDA, and those protections were subsequently removed."' The
"trans-inclusive ENDA" bill as it was called,' would have prohibited
employment discrimination because of "sexual orientation, actual or
perceived, and gender identity.""' Although the House of Representa-
tives successfully passed a trans-exclusive version of ENDA in 2007, the
bill failed to make it to a vote by the Senate.' Thus, every attempt dur-
ing the last thirty-seven years to pass sexual orientation or gender
identity non-discrimination protections, whether as amendments to The
312. Coffey, supra note 311, at 179.
313. See Weinberg, supra note 204, at 8.
314. See Weinberg, supra note 204, at 9.
315. See Weinberg, supra note 204, at 9 (citing S. 2238, 103d Cong. (1994)). In this ver-
sion of the bill, discrimination on the basis of gender identity was not prohibited-
only discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation. See S. 2238, 103d Cong.
(1994)).
316. See Weinberg, supra note 204, at 10. However, gender identity protections were
eventually sacrificed in an attempt to pass the bill with only sexual orientation protec-
tions. See id. at 11. This caused great discord within the LGBT community. See
Ethan Jacobs, Local activists take lead role in ENDA debate, EDGE (Oct. 11, 2007),
http://www.edgeboston.com/index.php?ch= news&sc=glbt&sc2= news&sc3= &id= 236
46.
317. See Jacobs, supra note 316.
318. See Weinberg, supra note 204, at 11 (citing Employment Non-Discrimination Act of
2007, H.R. 2015, 110th Cong. (2007). The bill defined "gender identity" as "the
gender-related identity, appearance, or mannerisms or other gender-related character-
istics of an individual, with or without regard to the individual's designated sex at
birth." Employment Non-Discrimination Act of 2007 § 3(a)(6))., H.R. 2015, 110th
Cong. (2007)).
319. See Weinberg, supra note 204, at 11-12.
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Civil Rights Act, or as stand-alone legislation, has thus far been unsuc-
cessful.
Arguments in favor of ENDA include: that stand-alone legislation
is one of the only means by which Congress can make its intent to pro-
tect the LGBT community clear (since apparently the broad language in
defining "because of sex" did not make Congress's intentions clear
enough to courts);320 that stand-alone legislation, if carefully construct-
ed, may be the best means by which to "account for the diversity and
fluidity of [the LGBT] community;32 1 and that as an independent piece
of legislation, ENDA would provide a decisive response to discriminato-
ry employers' and courts' allegations regarding the LGBT community's
attempts at "bootstrapping" sexual orientation and gender identity
claims onto what is "'really' a sex discrimination claim," a defense that
has successfully absolved discriminatory employers of liability.22
However, several considerations and counterarguments illustrate the
superior ability of Title VII, as reformulated under the EQA, to provide
for transgender equal employment opportunities and non-discrimination
protections. Initially, all of these arguments may be addressed, and could
be repudiated, in considering that these arguments are aimed at the cate-
gorical approach or current formulation of Title VII. These issues may
exist under the current framework of Title VII, but would not pose a
problem under the EQA.
First, the language of what would be the revised Title VII under the
EQA, as well as past and present legislative history, would make the in-
tent of the de-categorized Title VII clear: to "'make certain that the
channels of employment are open [ed by employers] to persons regardless
of [their membership in enumerated classes] and that jobs . . . are strict-
ly filled on the basis of qualification."323 With the EQA, courts will no
320. See supra Part I.B.
321. See Palmer, supra note 25, at 892 (citing Paisley Currah & Shannon
Minter, TRANSGENDER EQUALITY: A HANDBOOK FOR ACTIVISTS AND POLICY-
MAKERS 36-42 (2000), http://www.thetaskforce.org/downloads/reports/reports/
TransgenderEquality.pdf) (emphasizing the importance of drafting clear and effec-
tive statutory language for legislative materials).
322. See Jennifer Wilson, Note, Horizontal Versus Vertical Compromise in Securing LGBT
Civil Rights, 18 TEx. J. WOMEN & L. 125, 131 (2008) (citing Dawson v. Bumble &
Bumble, 398 F.3d 211 (2d Cit. 2005); Simonton v. Runyon, 232 F.3d 33, 35 (2d
Cit. 2000); Desantis v. Pac. Tele. & Tele. Co., 608 F.2d 327 (9th Cit. 1979) (hold-
ing that Title VII's prohibition of "sex" discrimination applies only to discrimination
on the basis of gender and should not be judicially extended to address "boot-
strapped" claims based on plaintiffs' homosexuality)).
323. Derum & Engle, supra note 302, at 1214 (quoting H.R. Rep. No. 88-914, pt. 2
(1963), reprinted in United States Equal Employment Opportunities Commission,
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF TITLES VII AND XI OF CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1964).
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longer be able to feign ignorance as to congressional intent, or idle in
indecision for fear of engaging in "judicial activism," in interpreting the
broad remedial statute that is (or is supposed to be) Title VII. The EQA
makes clear that only employment qualifications may be considered,
and that the purpose of the reformed Title VII is to provide actual equal
employment opportunities to anyone qualified for the employment.
Second, the argument that ENDA, carefully constructed, could
protect all component constituencies of the diverse LGBTQIA commu-
nity ignores past history and practical reality. This argument proposes to
protect LGBT individuals by adding and redefining categories within
the same categorical framework that has operated to proscribe protec-
tions for the same community at every turn. If the broadly defined term
"sex" in Title VII was interpreted narrowly and found insufficient to
cover individuals on the basis of sexual orientation and gender identity,
how can ENDA proponents so unrealistically trust the courts to define
these terms in a manner that comports with congressional intent? As
one scholar put it, "[1]eaving it up to the courts to interpret what consti-
tutes 'sexual orientation' or 'gender identity' may lead to the same battle
that Title VII claims 'because of sex' have demonstrated."3 24 This is en-
tirely correct, because ENDA would not alter the flawed framework.
However, the EQA will operate outside the constraints of a categorical
framework, and for that reason, the EQA is more likely to successfully
protect transgender employees.
Third, although ENDA would create new categories within Title
VII to protect individuals from discrimination on the basis of "sexual
orientation" or "gender identity," thereby avoiding the "bootstrapping"
problem, ENDA's categorically confined approach would still fall victim
to the host of criticisms and defects of the categorical approach generally.
In the process of avoiding the "bootstrapping" problem by crafting new
categories, ENDA would create several more (and more disconcerting)
problems because of those categories.
In terms of the transgender community within the larger LGBT
community, and gender identity or expression protections, some ver-
sions of the ENDA legislation have purposefully excluded protections
for transgender individuals. So, if such a version of ENDA was passed,
ENDA would still not afford equal employment opportunities and non-
discrimination protections to transgender persons. This incremental3 25
324. See Palmer, supra note 25, at 892.
325. The incremental approach has caused a deep divide within the LGBT community,
between those who wish to obtain some non-discrimination protections (i.e. against
discrimination "because of sexual orientation"), and those who are unwilling to sacri-
flice any part of the community for the sake of advancing protections for the rest.
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method of seeking protections for the LGBT community would not
only exclude the transgender collective, but it might also doom the gay,
lesbian and bisexual collective at the same time. Again, the categorical
approach reveals its weakness here-although gay, lesbian and bisexual
individuals would be protected from discrimination on the basis of sex-
ual orientation under almost any version of ENDA introduced thus far,
they would not be protected from discrimination based on their gender
non-conformity. Employers seeking to justify discrimination against the
LGBT community would be able to discriminate on the basis of gender
identity or gender non-conformity, and category-constrained ENDA
and Title VII legislation would be powerless to prevent it.32
Additionally, some within the LGBT community assert that the in-
cremental approach itself "reinforces systems of oppression" by
preferring the rights of non-transgender individuals in the LGBT com-
munity, seeking progress at the expense of transgender individuals and
their protections.327 Thus, ENDA remains flawed so long as it remains
category-driven legislation because LGBT individuals could still face
adverse employment action under an incomprehensive version of
ENDA legislation.328
After failed attempts to pass different versions of ENDA over the
course of thirty-seven years, it seems reasonable to doubt whether
ENDA will ever become law. Even if ENDA could overcome the practi-
cal obstacles in place and earn passage into law, as a category-dependent
approach to a category-caused problem, ENDA is not up to the task of
providing equal employment opportunities and protections for
transgender persons. Thus, for these reasons, the EQA is preferable to
ENDA.
Different rationales for incrementalism and thoroughness have been advanced. See
Ryan E. Mensing, A New York State of Mind: Reconciling Legislative Incrementalism
with Sexual Orientation Jurisprudence, 69 BROOK. L. REv. 1159, 1160-62 (2004).
326. See Wilson, supra note 322, at 131.
327. See Palmer, supra note 25, at 895 (quoting Julie A. Greenberg, Intersex and Intrasex
Debates: Building Alliances to Challenge Sex Discrimination, 12 CARDozo J.L. & GEN-
DER 99, 107 (2005)).
328. See Lambda Legal, Lambda Legal's Analysis of H.B. 3685: Narrow Version of ENDA
Provides Weaker Protections for Everyone, http://data.lambdalegal.org/pdf/enda-
llanalysis 20071016.pdf.
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5. Opposition to De-Categorization Generally:
A Response to Robert C. Post
In his work Prejudicial Appearances: The Logic ofAmerican Antidis-
crimination Law,329 Professor Robert C. Post offers a critique of what he
terms the "context-free" approach to anti-discrimination law, an ap-
proach that initially appears to have some similarities to the
Employment Qualifications Approach. Post's piece analyzes the logic
behind anti-discrimination law in the context of discrimination based
on appearance. The article begins by characterizing anti-discrimination
law as that which "understands itself as negating prejudice [regarding
judgments of a person's 'worth' when that person possesses certain char-
acteristics] by eliminating or carefully scrutinizing the use of
stigmatizing characteristics as a ground for judgment."330
Unfortunately, as discussed, Professor Post's insights, if implemented,
would lead to very little change in the theory or application of employ-
ment anti-discrimination law. That is to say, all of the same people
"winning" in employment (discriminatory employers and less qualified
employees promoted because they possess certain class characteristics)
would still come out "winning" on the other side of Professor Post's "so-
ciological account." This Part argues that such an approach would be
ineffective, and an approach such as the Employment Qualifications
Approach would have more success because it would reframe the debate
and restructure the system, rather than attempting to achieve reform by
conceding human fault and being resigned to a certain level of discrimi-
nation "because that is just how things are."
In his article, after discussing the congressional intent and meaning
of Title VII, Post turns his attention to the "context free" approach,
analytically arraigning the approach while advocating a different
method-one that he terms the "sociological account.""' Post makes
several criticisms of the "context free" approach, criticisms that might be
raised against the EQA and therefore merit further deliberation. Each
will be considered and responded to in turn.
Post begins by characterizing the "context free" approach as one
requiring that an individual be distilled into separate parts characteris-
tics and qualifications.332 Post asserts that after "effac[ing] forbidden
329. Robert C. Post, Prejudicial Appearances: The Logic of American Antidiscrimination
Law, 88 CAL. L. REv. 1 (2000).
330. Id at 9.
331. Id at 31.
332. Post compares this process to rendering an individual in the "original position" be-
hind a "veil of ignorance" in the Rawlsian fashion. Id. at 12.
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attributes," nothing more is revealed than the inherently equal "intrin-
sic worth" of individuals.333 He asserts that filtering out forbidden
attributes leaves employers with a metaphorical pile of nothing but
characteristics unable to "make distinctions between employees," and
therefore that anti-discrimination law must have a different purpose than
to merely "strip away prejudicial contingencies of social circumstances" in
order to render those factors beyond consideration in employment deci-
sions." Post recognizes that one function of anti-discrimination law is to
"uncover . .. an apprehension of 'individual merit" . .. [and an employ-
ee's] ability to perform the job.""' However, Post goes on to argue that
Title VII is not intended as a "context free" approach, but the purpose of
anti-discrimination law is to "transform[] preexisting social practices, such
as race or gender, by reconstructing the social identities of persons." Post
explains that "[ifn contrast to the ["context-free" approach], the socio-
logical account accepts the inevitability of social practices" and "focuses
on how the law reconstructs social practice, even at the sacrifice of
instrumental rationality.3 37
As Post depicts it, the "context free" approach is embodied by an
orchestra audition in which musicians are required to "play behind
opaque screens" so that those evaluating their talents may "overcome
. . 338ingrained sex discrimination" and focus on ability, not characteristics.
Or, as Post puts it, "[t]he musician becomes a perfectly disembodied
instrument.,1 Post takes issue with this approach to anti-discrimination
law, because he asserts that ability is "intrinsically connected" to some
characteristics (e.g., in this example to gender, such as the biological dif-
ferences between most men and women in regard to physical strength).
He acknowledges that the screen can be "serviceable only in discrete,
bounded, and exceptional circumstances," such as in orchestra audi-
tions, but not generally, as in employment. 340 Further, Post criticizes the
"context free" approach for purportedly dehumanizing individuals by
333. Id. at 12.
334. See id. at 9, 13.
335. See id. at 13 (citing U.S. v. Burke, 504 U.S. 229, 247 (1992) (Souter, J., concurring);
Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 361 (1978) (Brennan, White,
Marshall and Blackmun, JJ., joint opinion)).
336. See id. (citing Richard C. Paddock, California Album, Santa Cruz Grants Anti-Bias
Protection to the Ugly, L.A. TimEs, May 25, 1992, at A3).
337. See id. at 31.
338. See id. at 14.
339. See id. at 15.
340. See id. at 15-16.
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abstracting away their identifying characteristics and summing them up
in terms of abilities, not personality, race, or sex, and so forth.M'
The differences between the "context free" approach and the Em-
ployment Qualifications Approach are abundant. There is a significant
distinction between "abstracting away" personal characteristics to the
point that a person is the sum of nothing more than their abilities, total-
ly devoid of gender, race, or other identifying qualities on the one hand
(as Post characterizes the "context free" approach), and prohibiting con-
sideration of such characteristics for the purposes of making
employment decisions (under the EQA) on the other hand. Individuals
are not sexless because we do not consider their sex (as under the EQA's
framework), or at least no more sexless than individuals who are catego-
rized by sex and whose sex cannot be used in consideration of an
employment decision (as is the case with Title VII as currently con-
structed).
Moreover, Post frames the choice of framework as an ultimatum,
claiming that we can consider sex and have the best orchestra possible,
recognizing that the inquiry would "incorporate sex-related traits, or
sacrifice the quality of our orchestra in order to pursue a norm of sex
equality."34 2 But this is a false dichotomy. Post points out that in our eve-
ryday interactions, we do not consider people sexless, and that it would
be impossible to do so in the employment context, and therefore we
should accept and work within current social norms for change.3 43 It is
true that each of us often bases our interactions and judgments of others
to some extent on characteristics such as sex. If nothing else, sex serves
as a useful, crude, shorthand descriptor when speaking about someone
(e.g. "I met a nice woman at the store today."). However, it is important
to note a key distinction that Post either disregards or fails to make-an
approach such as the EQA is not advocating total blindness to all char-
acteristics in all contexts (as the "context free" approach might do). Post
refers to the "context free" approach and evaluates its desirability and
feasibility across all aspects of social interaction, but the EQA only deals
with the very specific and discrete context of employment. The EQA
merely prohibits employers from considering characteristics in the em-
ployment context, when making employment decisions-a very specific
context in which such characteristics almost always bear no rational rela-
tion to an employee's ability to do a job. Because of this, many of Post's
objections and concerns on this point are inapplicable. Admittedly,
while it might be quite difficult, if not impossible, to disregard all of a
341. See id. at 12.
342. See id. at 21.
343. See id. at 16.
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person's characteristics in everyday social interactions, or at minimum it
would require a broad reworking of social interaction generally, it does
not seem irrational or impossible to temporarily ignore irrelevant social
characteristics when rendering employment decisions. To use the orches-
tra audition metaphor, the EQA would simply require that employers
evaluate musicians on the music they play, not qualities that are unrelat-
ed to the music. It is possible to achieve success with an orchestra screen
because jobs can be reduced to objective qualifications, even if people
cannot be reduced to nothing but qualifications. Furthermore, if it is
necessary to avoid an otherwise discriminatory result, then temporarily
using a screen in employment evaluations to ensure that the most quali-
fied candidate is selected for the orchestra appears to be a fair, practical,
and viable means by which to accomplish that end.
Additionally, it is important to recognize that Post makes several as-
sumptions that underlie, inform, and animate his "sociological account"
theory. If these assumptions are improper, then the theory unravels to
some extent, if not entirely. Initially, Post assumes that if personal at-
tributes are removed from consideration (i.e., that one thinks of an
individual in a way that does not take into account their race, religion,
sex, etc.) that all that remains is the individual's "inherent worth" (which
does not overlap with an individual's qualifications)."' However, this
assumption grossly oversimplifies and ignores one of the main focuses of
employment (anti-discrimination) law: an individual's qualifications to
do a job. In broad terms, at the very least, individuals are made up of
their personal characteristics, "inherent worth," and, importantly, their
qualifications to do a job. With his discussion of the manner in which
employment anti-discrimination law effaces individuals, Post focuses
only on the sociological and philosophical aspects of personhood, to the
exclusion of objective, employment-related qualifications-the only
quality that almost everyone agrees is relevant and should be considered
in employment decisions. This exclusion improperly provides Post a bi-
ased basis on which to build and support his "sociological account"
theory of anti-discrimination law, much in the same way that an argu-
ment that individuals are only comprised of skills, experience and
qualifications to do a job would support the EQA (although that argu-
ment is not made herein). Recognizing this flawed foundation upon
which Post's "house" is "built," further analysis proceeds.
Post claims that implementing the "sociological account" would
have several benefits. One of the alleged benefits is that the "sociological
account" would "create greater judicial accountability" in that courts
344. See id. at 13.
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could implicitly or explicitly accept and justify the use of social practices
in judicial decisions, instead of making decisions on bases taking into
account impermissible characteristics and justifying the decisions with
different reasoning.' Another purported benefit of the "sociological
account" is "greater doctrinal coherence," or the ability of judges to "ex-
plain the actual justifications for their decisions."34 6 These asserted
benefits are related and employ similar reasoning, and therefore are
considered together. For example, in a case in which an employee alleges
employment discrimination "because of sex" for failure to conform to a
dress code based on gender norms, a court would be able to explicitly
justify its decision to uphold the gendered dress code based on "its ac-
ceptance of these norms."347 A judicial realist would likely agree that it
would be a benefit to have judges adjudicating cases with an open and
candid declaration of their reasoning for their decision, rather than mak-
ing decisions and justifying them with insincere and often unjustifiable
reasoning. However, aside from shining a light onto such practices that
are already taking place, the value of this alleged benefit of the "sociolog-
ical account" is unclear-in fact, there are disconcerting drawbacks to
this course of action that would far outweigh any claimed benefit of ju-
dicial accountability.
Post's "sociological account" would further entrench and perpetuate
societal norms and prejudices based on individuals' membership in cer-
tain groups, and allow courts to do so with official sanction.' So many
prejudices and social norms serve to damage and disenfranchise vulnera-
ble groups (e.g., transgender persons, women, persons of color). Open
recognition and sanctioned use of such norms is not a positive. It is ar-
guably just as "damaging to doctrinal structure" when judges make
decisions based on entrenched and prejudicial social norms because of
societal pressure to do so. Presumably, Post advocates this approach and
asserts this benefit because he believes that such norms are correct and
appropriate, and because he believes that such norms cannot be changed
within the "context free" approach. However, this Author asserts, and
the EQA embodies, a belief that wrongful and prejudicial social norms
can be changed within a system that does not focus on or perpetuate
them (generally or en route to changing them). The EQA disallows
345. See id. at 32.
346. See id. at 33.
347. See id. at 32.
348. See id. at 30 (In fact, Post admits as much: "courts are continuously re-evaluating
which stereotype should be permitted, in what contexts, and for what reasons. . . . to
the extent that gender remains a culturally inescapable fact, it also will remain inextri-
cably present in the application of Title VII").
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employers from utilizing or perpetuating such prejudicial and harmful
social norms, and that certainly seems like one reasonable and realistic
method by which to do away with them. It strains credulity to argue
that perpetuating a wrongful belief for any amount of time is the best
way to change it. If employers and courts honestly evaluate candidates
based solely on the basis of their employment qualifications under the
EQA, judicial accountability, doctrinal coherence, and other benefits
would surely follow.
-Post returns to his initial assumption in asserting the next supposed
benefit of the "sociological account," which is that courts would be able
to focus on and consider "the right question, the question that ought to
govern the application of antidiscrimination law."" 9 In Post's view, "the
point of antidiscrimination is to transform [rather than transcend] exist-
ing social practices," and courts should consider and ask "what purpose
the law expects to accomplish by such transformations. He asserts
that the purpose and goal of anti-discrimination law (past, present and
future, apparently) varies by category of person, "that the ambitions of
the law vary depending upon the social practice at issue. . . . antidis-
crimination law seeks to exercise a far more sweeping transformation of
race than gender.""' Post fails to explain his reasons for this assumption
and characterization. The lack of a BFOQ for race offers some evidence
that Congress may have intended to strike more forcefully at racial dis-
crimination than other types of employment discrimination. However,
this is not a decisive or clear indication that this is the correct of the two
characterizations (of Title VII as intended to strike at some types of dis-
crimination more than others, or Title VII as intended to equalize
employment opportunities and render certain characteristics "not rele-
vant" to employment decisions). Additionally, Post's characterization
limits Title VII to the congressional intent of the time, and the enumer-
ated classes of the statute. Equal employment opportunity without
categorical limitations may also transform social practices in a positive
way, and the lack of categorical constraints would allow the Title VII
(through EQA) to do so for more people. That Title VII is frozen in
time, and that equal employment opportunities and non-discrimination
protections will be forever denied to un-enumerated victims of discrim-
ination, including transgender persons, is an actuality that those
unenumerated victims cannot afford to accept.
The Supreme Court stated in Hopkins: "[i]n passing Title VII,
Congress made the simple but momentous announcement that sex,
349. See id. at 36.
350. See id
351. See id. at 36-37 (citing a lack of BFOQ for race as proof of this fact).
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race, religion, and national origin are not relevant to the selection, eval-
uation, or compensation of employees."35 2 Further, the point of
rendering such factors irrelevant is to "target" and eliminate "stubborn
but irrational prejudice."' This Article maintains that the "context free"
approach and the EQA are not equivalent, and furthermore, that the
EQA is a much better means by which to accomplish these ends than is
Professor Post's "sociological account."
CONCLUSION
It has been forty-seven years since the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and
Title VII became law. While employment non-discrimination efforts
and protections have come a long way for certain elect groups, other
groups including transgender individuals remain subject to rampant
discrimination and its attendant detriments. Title VII's categorical ap-
proach has failed many qualified individuals and employees, and for the
reasons explained herein, revision to Title VII's categorical framework
will not change that result. The ADA serves as an example "that where
the characteristic or characteristics used to define the protected group are
not easily categorized, defining the protected group becomes very diffi-
cult," if not impossible."' This is especially true for the differently-abled
and LGBT communities. This is precisely why Title VII's categorical ap-
proach will not suffice for transgender persons or others not currently
covered by Title VII. Ill-motivated employers seeking to justify discrimi-
nation against transgender individuals continually maneuver around Tide
VII's categorical constraints and discriminate with the greatest of ease.
Courts interpret broad remedial provisions narrowly and perform any
required legal maneuvering necessary to exclude transgender persons from
equal employment opportunities and non-discrimination protections.
Tide VII's categories are ill-fitting and ill-equipped to the task of tackling
pervasive and invidious employment discrimination. An individual's per-
sonal characteristics such as their sex bear no rational relation to their
ability to perform a job. This work has proposed an alternative to Title
VII's flawed categorical framework, the Employment Qualifications
Approach. The EQA would require that employers evaluate individuals
on the basis of their qualifications alone, and select the "most qualified"
352. Id. at 10 (citing Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 239 (1989) (Brennan,
J., plurality opinion)).
353. See Lam v. Univ. of Haw., 40 F.3d 1551, 1563 (9th Cir. 1994).
354. See Michael C. Falk, Note, Lost in the Language: The Conflict Between the Congres-
sional Purpose and Statutory Language of Federal Employment Discrimination
Legislation, 35 RUTGERS L.J. 1179, 1215-16 (2004).
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individual for the position-whether transgender, Libertarian, divorced,
Asian, or whatever other characteristics they possess. Unconstrained by
categorical limits, the EQA seeks to ensure that Tide VII is followed and
enforced in line with its broad remedial goals, taking into account chang-
es in the forms and targets of employment discrimination over time. It is
asserted herein that the EQA would result in numerous attendant bene-
fits which far outweigh any asserted potential drawbacks. It is this
Author's hope that via the Employment Qualifications Approach,
transgender persons and others will finally secure equal employment
opportunities, non-discrimination protections and all of the attendant
benefits of employment in the process. t
